Democracy Notwithstanding: Canada’s History of the Notwithstanding Clause and its Role in Human Rights

Posted on January 31, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Emma Celeste Thornley

Free Justice Statue photo and picture
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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enshrines a number of individual rights considered to be essential to the preservation of human rights. Among these are freedom of religion, expression, and association; the right to life, liberty and security of the person; and freedom from unreasonable search, seizure and arbitrary detention. It is a common assumption that these rights and freedoms are absolutely inalienable and immutable. That assumption is wrong.

The notwithstanding clause, otherwise known as Section 33, was introduced to the Canadian Charter by Pierre Trudeau’s office; it was a concession to satisfy concerns that the Charter of Rights, as Trudeau’s office had initially drafted it, was “too powerful” (Zimonjic, 2022). The language of Section 33 holds that parliament, or the legislature of any given province, could temporarily disregard a provision of the Charter outlined in sections 2, or 7-15 (Government of Canada, 2022). There are, of course, limitations; any declaration made via the notwithstanding clause shall cease to be of effect five years after its implementation, though it can be renewed at the end of that 5-year term. At the time of the Charter’s drafting, Section 33 was intended as an escape-hatch (Zimonjic, 2022), evocative of the American “state’s-rights” model. The general understanding was that the notwithstanding clause ought to be a last resort, utilized only in the most unusual of circumstances. By its definition, the notwithstanding clause had the power to disrupt the execution of a number of fundamental Charter principles.

While this power may seem overwhelming on its face, the ability to disregard or supersede an established Charter right is not an unprecedented one. There is a process, called the Oakes Test, by which laws that limit a Charter right can be evaluated as justifiable or an overreach of power. It is a litigious procedure, arising from the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in R v Oakes.

This 1986 case saw the accused, Oakes, charged with possession for the purposes of trafficking after police caught Oakes with hashish oil and cash on his person. Oakes held that the drugs were his own and that he had no intent of selling them; yet, at the time, Section 8 of the Narcotics Control Act, under which he had been charged, held that anyone found with illegal drugs on them was presumed guilty of trafficking. This established a “reverse onus” in Oakes’ criminal trial. Rather than the burden being upon the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Oakes had to prove his innocence (Centre for Constitutional Studies, 2019). Oakes and his lawyers challenged the constitutionality of this onus, claiming it violated his Section 11(d) Charter Right to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court agreed this right had been violated. The ultimate question, however, was whether the violation of this right was justifiable under Section 1 of the Charter: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”

The SCC ultimately ruled that to determine if a law’s imposition on an established Charter right was justifiable, the imposition had to pass a series of tests: first, that the law under review has a goal which is both “pressing and substantial”. Second, that the law limits the right in question only in such a way as is rationally connected to the law’s purpose. Third, the law must minimally impair the right. Fourth, the imposition upon the right is proportional to the effect of the law (Centre for Constitutional Studies, 2019). The Oakes Test is consequentially an effective, consistent measure by which to test whether a law has justifiably infringed upon a Charter right.

The notwithstanding clause’s metric of measurement is nowhere near as comprehensive nor consistent. It is typically invoked when there is a controversial court ruling (McKenzie-Sutter, 2022) and it can, in theory, provide a sanctified avenue by which provincial governments can override federal authority should a federal government overstep their jurisdictional reach (Callaghan, 2021). Supporters of the notwithstanding clause have opined that “It’s entirely possible that a judicial body will make a judgment on rights that many find abhorrent. Under a system where they wield ultimate authority over the matter, there is little recourse to challenge that judgment. The recent decision by the United States Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade is a stark example of this reality” (Callaghan 2021). While the notwithstanding clause is undoubtably conceptually admirable, its application has been controversial and, at times, in contradiction of Canadian citizens’ rights. Section 33 has been invoked some 26 times since its implementation. The majority of those invocations were tabled by Quebec. Most make it past initial invocation and into enactment. Some instances of particularly controversial uses of the notwithstanding clause in recent memory are Alberta’s 2000 case, Quebec’s 2019 case, and Ontario’s 2018, 2021 and 2022 cases.

In the first instance, Alberta invoked the notwithstanding clause in response to the federal government’s passing of Bill C-23 (CBC, 2012). Bill C-23 guaranteed same-sex couples the same benefits as heterosexual couples after a year of cohabitation. Alberta responded by passing Bill 202, which threatened to invoke the notwithstanding clause should Canada ever redefine marriage to anything other than a man and woman (CBC, 2012). The misuse of the notwithstanding clause is self-evident; the Supreme Court of Canada agreed, declaring Bill 202 and its threatened use of the notwithstanding clause ultra vires, or beyond legal authority, as of 2004 (S.C.R. 698, 2004).

In 2019, Quebec introduced the controversial Act Respecting the Laicity of the State, otherwise known as Bill 21. You may recall the furor that arose in the media after Quebec declared their intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause to support this act, which prohibited civil service employees and public teachers from wearing religious symbols, like kippahs, crosses and hijabs while working (Souissi, 2021). Quebec was successful in implementing the notwithstanding clause. Given the notwithstanding clause’s mandatory five year renewal, it may be overturned in the future; it will, regardlessly, impact the religious liberties of Quebec citizens in the meanwhile.

Ontario’s history with the notwithstanding clause is recent, and resultantly unique. In the province’s history, the notwithstanding clause has been utilized three times. First, in 2018, when the Ontario provincial government utilized Section 33 to reduce the number of wards in Toronto from 47 to 25. This reduction occurred alongside a municipal election, raising concerns that the Ford administration was severely infringing upon the democratic rights of voters (Ahmed, 2022). The second invocation occurred in 2021, when the Ford administration passed the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act. In sum, the act prohibited third-party election advertising and advocacy during the election period, such as labour unions. The legislation was found to override the Charter, and was consequently struck down by Ontario Courts (Kelly, 2022). In response, Ford’s administration overrode the Court using the notwithstanding clause. More recently, Ford’s administration tabled the Keeping Students in Class Act, which utilized the notwithstanding clause to mandate striking teachers back to work. It was lambasted as an “unprecedented attack on workers’ rights” (Koskie Minsky LLP, 2022), and consequently revoked and deemed “never in force” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2022).

In sum, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not the inflexible pillar it is sometimes perceived to be. In some instances, its “bending” is to the benefit of the citizenry. Section 33 could permit provincial governments to reject federal overreach, an insulation against oversteps by any prime minister’s administration. Yet like so many things, the notwithstanding clause can be invoked in ways that hinder, rather than uphold, basic rights. The “legalese” used to describe related governmental acts and resultant action can alienate most of us from the realities of what is being passed as law. That alienation may prevent us from realizing how, and when, Charter Rights and Freedoms are eroded without reasonable cause.

There is no question that we are privileged to live in a country like Canada. It is imperfect, and has a longstanding history of colonial violence, but it also has an established constitutional rights framework by which to challenge our own persisting human rights issues. Other nation-states do not necessarily have the same constitutional protections. Given our comparative privilege, it can be easy to forget that human rights are hard-won and, in some instances, easily lost. It is our civic duty to vigilantly monitor the ways in which our rights and freedoms as Canadians are in flux, to prevent government overreach at all levels. If the history of the notwithstanding clause can offer us any insights, it is that human rights are a constant practice, and not a milestone of democracy. We must constantly be mindful of how our rights adjust and flux, decade to decade, administration to administration.


Work Cited

Ahmed, H. (2022, August 8) Toronto v Ontario: Municipal Elections, Freedom of Expression, and Provincial Authority. Centre for Constitutional Studies. https://www.constitutionalstudies.ca/2022/08/toronto-v-ontario-municipal-elections-freedom-of-expression-and-provincialauthority/


Callaghan, G. (2022, July 6) In defence of the notwithstanding clause: Why Canada should hold onto it. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/in-defence-of-the-notwithstandingclause-why-canada-should-hold-onto-it-186375

CBC (2012, January 12) TIMELINE: Same-sex rights in Canada. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/timeline-same-sex-rights-in-canada-1.1147516

Kelly, Y. (2022, March 21) Ontario’s Bill 307 does more to restrict democracy than protect it. York Region News. https://www.yorkregion.com/opinion-story/10591141-ontario-s-bill-307-does-more-to-restrict-democracy-than-protect-it/


Koskie Minksky LLP (2022) The Keeping Students in Class Act. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e7137110-7583-4533-9f18-468074bd55c1

Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2022) Bill 35, Keeping Students in Class Repeal Act, 2022. https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/bills/parliament-43/session-1/bill-35

McKenzie-Sutter, H. (2022, Oct 31) What is the notwithstanding clause? An explainer on the rarely used provision. CTV News. https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/what-is-the-notwithstandingclause-an-explainer-on-the-rarely-used-provision-1.613270

Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79. https://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2196/index.do

Souissi, T. (2021, December 17) Bill 21 (An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State) The
Canadian Encyclopedia. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/bill-21

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Youth Identity and Hong Kong’s New National Security Education

Posted on January 26, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Shivahn Garvie

National security education was incorporated into the Hong Kong school curriculum in the 2021-22 academic year as a consequence of growing localist sentiment and anti-Beijing creed. Last year, the Hong Kong Education Bureau substituted “liberal studies” in secondary schools for a new subject called “citizenship and social development,” and this year authorities have announced that the “current life and society” subject will also be replaced within the next two years.

“Liberal studies” was offered as an optional course in Hong Kong secondary schools alongside “life and society” as of 2012. “Life and society” covered the socioeconomic development of Hong Kong and China and their distinct political systems, but saw minimal uptakes. Pending the expiration of Hong Kong’s autonomy from China approaching in 2047, many fear that the education reforms only mark the beginning of cultural and institutional change in the city. Pro-Beijing politicians accused the more popular elective, “liberal studies”, of radicalizing youth and inciting the 2019 anti-government protests. As a consequence, the Hong Kong Education Bureau replaced “liberal studies” with “citizenship and social development,” centered on lawfulness, patriotism and promoting students’ understanding of China’s national security to foster a national identity.

The core values of “life and society” included social justice and freedom, but the words, “democracy”, “integrity” and “social justice” are notably absent from the curriculum of its replacement subject, “citizenship, economics and society”. Unlike the old subject that aimed to induce political participation, the new subject has dropped content regarding government decision-making procedures, including an admonishment to communicate with the Legislative Council. Instead, “citizenship, economics and society” is oriented towards enriching students’ understanding of Beijing’s jurisdiction through outlining the primary offences under the national security law and the Hong Kong Basic Law. The Education Bureau announced that they would provide teaching materials for the new subject at the beginning of this academic year, and textbooks for 2024. The textbooks will be reviewed by a committee whose members remain undisclosed, ostensibly to protect them from external pressure and prejudice. However, many question the legitimacy of the committee and these textbooks given that the new “citizenship and social development” textbooks from earlier this year erroneously claimed that Hong Kong was never a British colony, but merely an occupied territory.

In addition to academic content reforms, Hong Kong schools are facing pressure to increase teaching time apportioned to patriotic content. The Education Bureau has asked Hong Kong schools to allocate a quarter of teaching time during primary school education to activities and discussions concerning Chinese culture and the constitution. This overhaul of Hong Kong’s primary school education is driven by a new curriculum guide that emphasizes the cultivation of a sense of belonging and identity through national security education to become responsible citizens. This is a stark contrast to the learning goals under the old guide, which stressed the importance of discriminating between right and wrong and tolerance towards diverse values.

Owing to these changes, the Education Bureau conducted an inspection of 169 out of 1,160 schools in Hong Kong in the 2021-22 academic year and deduced that efforts to incorporate national security education into the curriculum was “unsatisfactory”. This inspection was brought on by the revision of the teachers’ code of conduct which details that they must advance national education and divulge illegal activities or “morally deviant information” to authorities. The previous administration promised to revamp the code after lawmakers accused teachers of instigating students’ participation in the 2019 protests.

As the expiration of Hong Kong’s autonomy from China approaches in the year 2047, many fear that these education reforms only mark the beginning of cultural and institutional change in the city. However, the reluctant uptake of nationalist initiatives promises the retention of Hong Kong culture and values for the time being.

Works Cited

Kang-Chung, Ng. “Patriotism, national security education should make up a quarter of primary schools’ teaching time, Hong Kong Education Bureau says”, South China Morning Post, 8 September 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/3191871/hong-kong-education-bureau-suggests-primary-schools-spend?module=hard_link&pgtype=article.

Yiu, William. “What you need to know about Hong Kong’s new school subject focused on national security, sense of belonging”, South China Morning Post, 16 October 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/3196123/what-you-need-know-about-hong-kongs-new-school-subject.

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What Does a World Cup Cost?

Posted on January 24, 2023 | Leave a comment

By Saba Brittain

Undoubtedly the most viewed, and high on the list of the world’s most unifying sporting events, the FIFA World Cup captures the attention of billions around the globe, and last year 32 nations participated, competing for the cup in Qatar. The announcement of Qatar as host of the 2022 World Cup put the country in the international spotlight, drawing criticisms against FIFA and the Qatari government concerning the unjust treatment of migrant workers, who were indispensable to carrying out the numerous construction projects.

Qatar, a country of a smaller size than the state of Connecticut, won the bid to host the 2022 World Cup in December of 2010. The scale of the event required Qatar to launch major construction projects⁠— including new roads, stadiums, hotels, and transportation⁠— in preparation for welcoming 1.5 million football fans. While the exact amount spent by the Qatari government on infrastructure since 2010 remains unclear, the estimates range from 200-300 billion dollars. (Foxman, Nair, 2022).

Let’s consider the fact that Qatar depends on a 2 million strong migrant workforce, which makes up 90% of the country’s overall workforce, and a significant portion of the country’s overall population (Dart, 2022). At the source of the systemic abuse against the millions of migrant workers in Qatar is the kafala (or sponsorship) system, an exploitative labour law system used mostly in the region of the Arab Gulf. The kafala system subjects the migrant worker to the strict control of their employer, who commands the workers’ entry or exit of the country, their ability to change jobs, the renewal of work permits, and their legal status in the country (Dumoulin, 2021). This system facilitates the exploitation of migrant workers and violation of migrant worker rights. Being subject to the will and interest of their employers, migrant workers can be trapped in working conditions that are extremely abusive without any opportunity to leave or oppose. 

While Qatar has implemented some labour law reforms⁠— notably, allowing migrant workers to change jobs without the approval of a former employer and slightly wage increases⁠— these reforms have not been sufficient to abolish the kafala system in Qatar as a whole. Indeed, migrant workers in Qatar have no protection against labour exploitation and are still closely tied to their employer, relying on them for their legal status and permission of entry/exit of the country (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The kafala system is one of many other abuses against migrant workers in Qatar: there have been numerous reports of mysterious injuries, migrant worker deaths due to “natural causes”⁠— a seemingly interchangeable term to describe extreme heat exhaustion⁠— and unpaid wages. 

Despite these reports, FIFA’s silence towards the migrant worker abuse in Qatar has been deafening. They hold responsibility in their decision of granting the right of hosting the World Cup to Qatar without imposing any conditions protecting the human rights of migrant workers employed to build their stadiums. (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

FIFA was aware of the infrastructure deficit in Qatar with regards to accommodating a World Cup and chose to benefit from the exploitation of migrant workers instead of change it. 

Works Cited

Dumoulin, Caroline. “The Kafala System: Incremental Reform Is Not Enough to Stop Abuse against Migrant Domestic Workers.” International Law and Policy Brief, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/nov/27/qatar-deaths-how-many-migrant-workers-died-world-cup-number-toll

Lewis, Aimee, et al. “’Our Dreams Never Came True.’ These Men Helped Build Qatar’s World Cup, Now They Are Struggling to Survive.” CNN, Cable News Network, 21 Nov. 2022, www.cnn.com/2022/11/17/football/qatar-2022-world-cup-migrant-workers-human-rights-spt-intl/index.html.

“Q&A: Migrant Worker Abuses in Qatar and FIFA World Cup 2022.” Human Rights Watch, 18 Nov. 2022, www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/18/qa-migrant-worker-abuses-qatar-and-fifa-world-cup-2022#Q11.

“Qatar: End All Migrant Worker Exit Visas.” Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/06/qatar-end-all-migrant-worker-exit-visas.

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Atomic Orthodoxy: Russia and the End of the World

Posted on January 19, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Jude Lobo

Patriarch Kirill,Vladimir Putin - Religion News Service
Courtesy of Alexander Zemlianichenko via AP Photo

At a pro-war rally held in the center of Moscow on March 18th, 2022, passionate sentiments of pride on the anniversary of Russia’s reclamation of Crimea and support for the ongoing efforts of Russian soldiers fighting to “liberate” Ukraine were shared, broadcast across Russia by state sponsored networks. The crowning moment of the pro-war rally occurred during a speech given by Putin himself, who paraphrased the Bible in an effort to justify the invasion of Ukraine to over 200,000 Russians in attendance: “There is no greater love than if someone gives his soul for his friends” (John 15:13) (Quay 4). This curious mixture of religion and propaganda that has been taking a hold of Russian politics in the last two decades is explained in part by Maria Engstrom’s essay on “Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy”, particularly through the concept of “Katechon” and its resulting effects on Russian foreign policy and security doctrine.


Engstrom brings to light the understanding of Russia as “Katechon”, a Christian Orthodox term popularized by 20th century right-wing intellectual circles to serve as the “unofficial” official ideology of post-Soviet Russia. “Russia as Katechon” portrays Russia to be the world’s ‘shield’ against the apocalyptic forces of chaos, with the Russian state itself existing to defend against the Antichrist and the resulting end of times (Engstrom 357). Engstrom points out that this neoconservative understanding of the inherent purpose of the Russian state is not an aberration paraded by a handful of fringe conservative groups. Rather, it is literally embedded into the policy goals of Russia itself. For example, Russian foreign policy and state security doctrine have regressed to an outlook of the world that is more at home with religio-medieval dogma than modern international relations theory. For example, all states beyond Moscow’s control are interpreted uniformly as in league with the “external antichrist” (i.e. the decadent “Great Sodom” that is the West), whilst those within Russia’s borders not in agreement with official state ideology are considered the “internal antichrist”, no less dangerous than its external counterpart (Engstrom 363). Thus, because the Russian state is always understood to be under attack within this framework. Seemingly contradictory statements such as the following, spoken by influential young conservative publicist Egor Kholmogorov, make perfect sense: “Russians always “defend”, even when it might seem that they attack” (Engstrom 365).

Thus, it is in such a way that one sees the doctrine of “Atomic Orthodoxy” take shape, Russia’s “double shield”, composed of Orthodoxy to secure Russia on the ideological front and the atomic military-industrial complex to secure Russia’s physical frontiers (Engstrom 368). An oxymoronic environment which produces phenomena such as Orthodox priests blessing atomic warheads, this “double shield” policy delivers one clear neoconservative message: If it means saving the world from the clutches of the Antichrist, Russians are more than ready to “remove the lid”, as it is understood to be their sacred duty (Engstrom 368). The Russians will stop at nothing to achieve their interests, because ‘they are the third empire, and there shall not be a fourth. After Russia is only the Apocalypse” (Engstrom 368).

In line with Engstrom’s 2014 analysis, one can see Russia’s “Double Shield” out in full force eight years later, with Putin pushing neoconservative Orthodox dogma on the home front whilst his army liberates Ukraine from “evil” abroad, all the while flexing Russia’s nuclear capabilities should the West ever think of interfering with Russia’s “holy” struggle (Quay, Guardian 1). Critically speaking, in an effort to extend Engstrom’s analysis, one cannot help but wonder what Russia’s approach means for the world order: Is the cultivation of a Messianic destiny, backed by nuclear weapons, all one needs to supersede the global order? As thousands of years of political history mired in religious dogma have shown, it is hard to debate against “god” or even an idea which claims to be backed by “god”; Thus, one cannot expect the Russian people to emancipate themselves from such a compelling line of propaganda, one no less backed by the threat of overwhelming military violence. The prospect of this unique “double shield” threat, in my view, warrants the development of a “double sword” doctrine to meet it, namely, one that seeks to delegitimize the Russian leadership at every level, exposing the fact that their support for Orthodoxy and Messianic destiny is a loose ploy to legitimize their own control over their state (First Sword), and further, one that dares to tread the Cold-War-era path of nuclear diplomacy, enforcing the idea that playing hard and fast with nuclear weapons does not lend one free reign over the established global order (Second Sword).

Russia’s actions warrant global action, as Putin’s eyes are not only in Ukraine, but are on the entire globe. Both his methods and his aims are global in nature: his call for fighters from around the world to join the Russian Army to expel “evil” from Ukraine are not unlike the calls put out by various Islamic terror groups, calling fighters to help in the establishment of a “Global Ummah”. The phenomenon of “Atomic Orthodoxy” in Russia is certainly unusual, but by no means is it historically unique. The West would do well to ensure that the threat of ending history (and the world) outright does not invite history to repeat itself, with religion once again being misused towards politically immoral ends.

Works Cited

Engström, Maria. “Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 35, no. 3, 2014, pp. 356–379., https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.965888. .

Guardian. (2022, February 28). Putin signals escalation as he puts Russia’s nuclear force on high alert. The Guardian. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/vladimir-putin-puts-russia-nuclear-deterrence-forces-on-high-alert-ukraine

Quay, Grayson. “Putin Quotes Jesus to Justify Invasion of Ukraine.” Yahoo! News, Yahoo!, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-quotes-jesus-justify-invasion-155344994.html.

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“OneLove” – Human Rights at the World Cup

Posted on January 17, 2023 | Leave a comment

By Laura Moldoveanu

What distinguishes human rights issues from celebrations of culture? Is culture a sufficient excuse or justification for the mistreatment of minority groups? Recently, these two questions have gained substantial traction within the media as the 2022 FIFA World Cup approaches, being held this year in Qatar—which is where the controversy begins.

The decision to hold this year’s FIFA World Cup in Qatar was deemed highly problematic by some due to Qatar’s record of human rights violations, as is demonstrated by the country’s criminalization of homosexuality, which can result in up to three years of prison in the country (Lewis 2022). In response, the “OneLove” campaign, an initative founded in the Netherlands to celebrate diversity within soccer communities, was due to take center stage (New York Post, 2022). To show their support, participants wear an armband featuring a multi-coloured heart to represent those belonging to all heritages, genders, and sexual identities. These armbands are meant to stand against discrimination and promote inclusion. The captains of seven countries competing were set to wear these armbands in solidarity, including England, Wales, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands (Ramsay and Nabbi, 2022). However, due to recent actions taken by FIFA itself, the initiative has been abandoned.

To discourage players from wearing OneLove armbands throughout the World Cup, FIFA declared that players found wearing said armbands would be given yellow cards and may face additional sanctions (Ramsay and Nabbi, 2022) as punishment. FIFA’s efforts seemingly succeeded, as all seven soccer federations backed down from the campaign. In a joint statement, they asserted that “[a]s national federations we can’t put our players in a position where they could face sporting sanctions, including bookings” (New York Post, 2022). Thus, the movement was quashed before it ever truly began. Even so, the situation introduces another issue regarding Qatar’s stance on LBGTQ+ rights: some fans feel unsafe travelling to Qatar, fearing for their safety (Lewis 2022).

The Secretary General of FIFA, Fatma Samoura, said in a statement, “[n]o matter your race, your religion, your social and sexual orientation, you are most welcome, and Qataris are ready to receive you with the best hospitality that you can imagine” (Lewis 2022). However, at the same time, a statement from Qatar’s Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy (SC) reads, “[e]veryone is welcome in Qatar, but we are a conservative country and any public display of affection, regardless of orientation, is frowned upon. We simply ask for people to respect our culture” (Lewis 2022). In this case, then, culture seems to obfuscate matters of human rights, as the line between what is to be considered a human rights abuse and what is to be considered part of a separate country’s culture becomes blurred.

Teams were reportedly asked to “keep politics off the field” (New York Post, 2022). This raises the question: are human rights a strictly political issue, or do they supersede the realm of politics and possess a more universal significance? Should there be certain criteria necessary for selecting a country to host an international event as important as the World Cup? If so, how could such criteria be implemented while balancing the line between cultural relativism and cultural imperialism?

The Football Supporters’ Association, a representative body based in England and Wales, made a poignant statement encapsulating the situation. It reads, “[t]oday we feel contempt for an organisation that has shown its true values by giving the yellow card to players and the red card to tolerance… No country which falls short on LGBT+ rights, women’s rights, workers’ rights or any other universal human right should be given the honour of hosting a World Cup” (Thorogood, 2022). It is clear that this situation is bigger than Qatar or soccer alone. Human rights are a topic of contention all around the world. Countries must figure out how to toe the line between respecting different cultures and standing up against blatant human rights transgressions.

References

Associated Press. “FIFA Threats Force World Cup Teams to Abandon ‘OneLove’ Armband.” New York Post. New York Post, November 21, 2022. https://nypost.com/2022/11/21/fifa-threats-force-world-cup-teams-to-abandon-onelove-armband/ .

Lewis, Aimee. “’It’s Not Safe and It’s Not Right.’ Qatar Says All Are Welcome to the World Cup but Some LGBTQ Soccer Fans Are Staying Away.” CNN. Cable News Network, November 19, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/19/football/qatar-world-cup-2022-lgbtq-rights-spt-intl/index.html.

Ramsay, George, and Zayn Nabbi. “England’s Harry Kane and Several Other European Captains Told Not to Wear ‘Onelove’ Armband at World Cup.” CNN. Cable News Network, November 22, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/21/football/onelove-armband-qatar-2022-world-cup-spt-intl.

Thorogood, James. “Onelove Campaign Hit by Threat of FIFA Sanctions .” dw.com. Deutsche Welle, November 21, 2022. https://www.dw.com/en/world-cup-2022-onelove-campaign-hit-by-threat-of-fifa-sanctions/a-6381 8810.

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Do the Right Thing: Black People and the Problem of Police Brutality

Posted on January 12, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Cassandra Nyimbili

Do the Right Thing (1989) - IMDb
Courtesy of 40 Acres and a Mule, 1989

In 1989, famed director Spike Lee created Do the Right Thing, a film following the story of the Wall of Fame inside an Italian-American-owned pizzeria in a Black community. As tensions rise in the community due to the Wall featuring only famous Italian-Americans instead of also including famous African-Americans, due to the pizzeria being located in a predominantly African-America area, conversations are held to understand the treatment of Black people by other ethnicities, especially white people. Parallels can be drawn between 1989 and the present while keeping the messages of trailblazers Martin Luther King Jr and Malcolm X throughout the call to action. The main message of the movie is brought to the attention of the main character Mookie when the Mayor tells Mookie to “always do the right thing,”1 although he brushes off 1 the advice in the moment, the message becomes more apparent as the movie continues. All around the neighbourhood are conversations and actions with racial undertones and overt instances. Prevalent topics in the film include stereotypes, Black people’s influence on society, and the relationship between police and Black people.

This film creates an environment for viewers to understand the climate the characters were living in and compare it to the present day. The successes of Black people are constantly left out of the conversation when discussing people who have impacted the world we live in today. The central conflict in the film is the lack of inclusion for Black people on Sal’s wall of fame. The white characters in the movie continually disregard the importance of Black people. Pino takes away his favourite celebrities’ Blackness because they don’t fit his idea of what Black people should be like; the landlord wears a Larry Bird shirt, and when Black people don’t act according to how Sal and Pino think they should, they disregard their business and resort to using the n-word to describe them. The blatant mistreatment of the Black people in their neighbourhood directly translates into the main conflict of the hall of fame. Buggin’ Out wants people such as Malcolm x, Nelson Mandela, and Michael Jordan as people who should be on the wall, but Sal doesn’t see their importance being on the wall; he threatens his patron with violence and kicks him out as a result2. This scene is the beginning of Sal’s overt mistreatment of Black people, that catapults the movie into its following stages.

Radio Raheem’s death reflects the society where police violence against Black people is repeated. When Lee released this movie, he dedicated it to Eleanor Bumpurs, Michael Griffith, Arthur Miller, Edmund Perry, Yvonne Smallwood, and Michael Stewart. Five of these people were murdered by police while Griffth was a victim of the mob3. 36 years after this film’s release Black people are still victims of police brutality; the only difference in the headlines being the names. The names that many people today recognize are George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, Elijah Mcclain, Atatiana Jefferson, Daunte Wright. When comparing the victims of the 80s to now, it is evident that police brutality is still prevalent. Sentiments of characters in the movie reflect the opinions of people today when similar events to Radio Raheem’s death occur, such as, “They didn’t have to kill the boy,” “They did it again,” and “He died because of a radio.”4 This repetition of death within the Black community shows society’s disregard and disrespect for Black life. Black people are seen as less than their white counterparts and less deserving of their rights.

Spike Lee immerses viewers into a world similar to ours with the community, the personalities, and the heartbreak. Getting to know the characters who ultimately end up hurt by the events that play out reflects the real lives that are being affected every time the police murder a Black person. As a society, it is our job to fight the powers working against Black people. Through advocacy, action, and doing the right thing, the trajectory of Black lives can be changed.

Works Cited

1,4Do the Right Thing (Universal Pictures, 1989).

2 Ibid

3 Richard Brody, “The Enduring Urgency of Spike Lee’s ‘Do the Right Thing’ at Thirty,” The New Yorker, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/the-front-row/the-enduring-urgency-ofspike-lees-do-the-right-thing-at- thirty.

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A Review of Russia, by Dmitri Trenin

Posted on January 10, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Pengyu Chen

           Dmitri Trenin declares in his preface that Russia is a book intended for readers who are unfamiliar with Russia’s history. As such, Trenin aims to present Russian history in a way which differs from the West’s understanding of Russia as “negative and controversial” (vii). In doing so, Russia takes the reader on a 200-page excursion of 120 years of Russian history, detailing the historical and political development, which explains much of Russia’s contemporary behaviour. Trenin treats Russia as having its own “version of exceptionalism,” which makes it distinct from other nations (8). He suggests that there is a “bedrock” underneath Russia that continues to strengthen the “core features of the nation’s existence, its self-image, and its worldview” and that the reader can only understand these changes by examining the “collective experience” of the Russian people (3). The book’s central thesis holds that, while Russia has experienced changes to its ruler and government, it nonetheless remains a “succession of states and represents the continuity of a country” precisely because Russian society has retained the core features which make it exceptional (9). Trenin presents two momentous and recurring features which have shaped the last 120 years of Russia’s political development. First, Russia’s strong rejection of foreign domination persists alongside her acquiescence toward domestic authoritarianism (9). Second, Russia’s “essentially lonely” nature (despite having a high degree of contact with other countries) (9). And Russia’s frequent contact with foreign countries is often the source of external threats and modernization (9). While his analysis of Russia’s ‘loneliness’ is a noteworthy observation, the reader should pay more attention to how Trenin imagines the boundary of Russia, as well as what he means by being Russian.

            Russia gives the reader a quick survey of Russia’s 20th century, presenting important themes such as culture, economy, society, and ideology. The reader will learn about the ‘Silver Age’ of Russian arts, the New Soviet Man, refugees escaping Communist Russia, the GULAG, economic developments and policies, protest movements, state-society relations, and much more. Trenin’s discussion of the state and its leaders, foreign relations, and elite politics is the most emphasized component. By giving a brief historical account of Russian history—from the 1917 Russian civil war to Putin’s 21st-century ascension—through which he illuminates the causes of critical events, Trenin highlights the persistent and significant role of a strong state and authoritarian leader in providing stability during times of upheaval in Russia’s history. Further, Trenin asserts that evil consequences often ensue after state collapse (179).

            Tracing the collective experience of the Russian people, Trenin makes the case that while leaders of Russia had extraordinary agency in shaping the country’s political trajectory, it is the enduring feature of the people’s will to reject foreign domination of Russia at the expense of their “own domestic sovereignty vis-a-vis [the state]” that prevented the breakdown of Russia in challenging times (9). Trenin believes that this forfeiture of individual autonomy to the authoritarian rule at home is the “supreme national value” and is deeply embedded in the “Russian psyche” (7, 9). However, while there is much evidence one can point to, such as the 1812 Napoleonic War, or the Great Patriotic War, there is also ample evidence that challenges the reading that Russians see their submission to authority as a “supreme national value.” Notably, Trenin himself remarks that the 1905 and 1917 peasant revolutions in Tsarist Russia were a key pretext for the rise of the Bolsheviks (26-34). Also, he notes that many Russians fled to Europe to escape Communist rule (125). Furthermore, considering Pyotr Stolypin’s implementation of martial law, Lenin’s Cheka, Stalin’s Purge, and the tradition of the Russian security agency, all to maintain social stability, fearing uprising and unrest from societal groups, the reader should seriously question the merit of Trenin’s argument that there has been a consensus, tacit or explicit, between the ruled and the ruler on the “supreme national value,” even in times of crisis (9).

            Moreover, the reader is left wondering, by the end of the book, whether Trenin’s claim about the recurring core feature of Russian’s acquiescence toward authoritarianism (and the persistent pattern of authoritarianism itself) will continue to be a ‘recurring’ feature. Indeed, Trenin himself points to the possibility that generational change and existing political conditions could lead to a state that is less authoritarian in nature (163). Even though Putin and the state are authoritarian, the establishment of democratic electoral institutions and a growing middle class in Russia could one day transform this core recurring feature.

            To be more charitable, the reader can concede that Trenin is suggesting an account that Russian exceptionalism derives from a transcendental conception of Russia as a nation that conceives an amorphous territory and a population that inheres Russia’s millennium-long history and the two core recurring features as its national mentality and traits. However, it is equally important to examine who are the “Russian people” and what Russia is as an “unbroken whole” (9, 11). While Trenin explains what Russia is not—that today’s Russia is not a different country from the USSR and the Russian Empire—he fails to give an affirmative account of what Russia is. Indeed, there is not a definitive answer to this, and expecting Trenin to answer it persuasively in a 200-page book is unreasonable. Nevertheless, this absence should make the reader (re)consider his formulation of Russia as an “unbroken whole.” The fact that Russia’s territory has been reduced substantially after the collapse of the Russian Empire and again after the dissolution of the USSR has central implications for the conception of Russia. This geopolitical decline seriously challenges his conception of Russia as a whole, given that many of the populations formerly belonging to the Russian Empire and USSR are not a part of contemporary Russia. It is also questionable to claim the population who were once within the territory of the Russian Empire and the USSR as “Russians.” According to NKVD records, “half-million Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Belarusians fought the Soviets in rural areas” (Colton 53). Also, anti-Soviet ethnonationalist movements during and after the Soviet rule also challenge Tenin’s reading of Russia as an “unbroken whole” (153-154).

            Trenin’s account of the second core feature is more compelling and conforms to the charitable reading of Russia as a nation that persistently embodies “a Russian psyche” In the last 120 years, Russia has been lonely and exceptional in its vain search for national security amidst an unfriendly, modernizing world. Japan challenged Russia’s presence in the Far East, leading to a major defeat in 1905 for the Russian Empire (25-26). In 1917 Russia was forced to fight against Germany but was never invited to the 1919 Versailles peace conference and the League of Nations (46). In the 1930s, Britain and France had little concern for the fate of the USSR, so Russia, relying on itself, was pressured into signing a non-aggression pact with Germany (78-79). Trenin argues that Russia had to rely on itself in challenging times and thus often finds itself isolated. Indeed, increased connectivity with China, Britain, and the U.S. in the 1940s ended soon thereafter upon the rise of the Cold War. Meaningful and friendly engagement with the West since then never occurred, despite the disintegration of the Union and the introduction of capitalism and electoral democracy in the 1990s (145-146). Confrontation with the U.S. and NATO became more real after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its intervention in Syria (173-174). However, its relationship with China grew closer (174). Russia, Trenin argues, has been estranged from the West but is “by no means isolated” (173-174). Indeed, current events support Trenin’s analysis: the ongoing Russian-Ukraine War has deteriorated US-Russia and EU-Russia relationship while Russia has become closer to China.

            The reader can strengthen Trenin’s account of Russia’s relative isolation by arguing that Russia’s geography and historical legacies played a deterministic role in shaping the political attitude and choices of the Russian elites. Russia is vast, remote, and difficult to access by sea. While this geographical limit prevented Russia from naval invasions, it also foreclosed the reach of sea merchants and the exchange of ideas (Poe 49). The centrality of Russian Orthodoxy and Russia’s closed borders also stifled any intellectual and cultural exchange with the West (Poe 41). Moreover, the relative proximity with Western Europe—and the extraordinary technological and military ascendance of the former circa 1500-1600—threatened Russia and agitated its reform process, eventually producing a distinctly Russian form of social organization (Poe 38-57).

            Even if the reader rejects the persistent “bedrock” underneath Russia, Trenin’s analysis of Russia’s political pattern—1) authoritarian rule as a persistent feature and 2) relative isolation—offers a good measure by which the reader can judge Russia’s contemporary political development. When the authoritarian state is absent, Russia will likely reverse into political instability (9). Trenin suspects that “a political crisis following Putin’s final departure is virtually pre-programmed” (162). And, while Trenin makes clear in Russia’s conclusion that post-Putin Russia might not embrace liberal capitalism and conform partially to the West, his analysis of Russia’s relative isolation gives freshness and trenchancy to his interpretation of a “Russian’s Russia” and provide the non-specialist reader with a good historical account of where “Russia is coming from.”

Bibliography

Colton, Timothy J. Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, Oxford University Press, 2016.

Poe, Marshall T. The Russian Moment in World History. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2003.

Trenin, Dmitri. Russia. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2019.

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Qatar’s World Cup

Posted on January 10, 2023 | Leave a comment

“The deadliest sporting event in history”

By Muhammed Bamne

Qatar: FIFA must act on labour abuses as World Cup qualifiers kick off - Amnesty International
Courtesy of Colin Foo via Amnesty International

           Tens of millions of football fans all over the world were rejoicing as the 2022 FIFA World Cup began. Since 2010, when Qatar won the contract to host the 2022 World Cup, it has spent upwards of $220 billion on unprecedented construction to prepare for this World Cup (Worden, 2022). Qatar has evidently spared no expense to transform its desert into a beaming hub of decadence, complete with new stadiums, buildings, hotels, and highways—that is, until one considers the migrant workers who built this infrastructure. Investigative journalism and reports from Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have found disturbing human rights abuses including the death of over 6,500 migrant workers during Qatar’s construction, making it one of the deadliest sporting events in history (Pattisson & McIntyre, 2021). The list of human rights abuses also includes expensive recruitment fees, appalling living conditions, threats from their employers, modern-slavery tactics, and lying about and delaying worker salaries (Goodman & Worden, 2022) all against a backdrop of LGBTQ+ discrimination, disregard for women’s rights and a lack of press freedom to investigate aforementioned migrant abuses (Goodman & Worden, 2022, Human Rights Watch, 2022).

            Gianni Infantino, FIFA’s president, opened a news conference in Doha, Qatar, with a surprising one-hour monologue, stating: “Today I feel Qatari. Today I feel Arab. Today I feel African. Today I feel gay. Today I feel disabled. Today I feel a migrant worker.” (Goodman & Worden, 2022). Doubtful to say the least, as Qatar has some of the most repressive migrant labour policies in the world, beginning with their abusive “Kafala” labor sponsorship system which uses “modern-day slavery” tactics to provide as much cheap and dispensable labour as possible (Goodman & Worden, 2022). The “Kafala” is a debt-bondage system, in which migrant workers looking to work in Qatar must take out loans to be recruited for work. These loans can range from seven hundred to fourteen thousand USD, in some cases a financially crushing responsibility which can take years to pay off (Goodman & Worden, 2022). Migrant workers in Qatar are then tied to their employers, or “sponsors,” and cannot request or renew their residence permits without the sponsor’s permission. However, if the sponsor fails to renew the permit, it is the worker who faces punishment (Amnesty International, 2021).

            Additionally, these workers face deadly working environments, some of which possess exorbitant heat levels. There is also the systemic use of stealing and delaying wages of migrant workers. Thousands of migrant workers suffer from late or non-payment of wages (Amnesty International, 2021), thus taking out costly loans to pay the illegal recruitment fees. These have devastating impacts on workers who are providing not only for themselves but for families back home–many of these workers have had to return home with no money as a result (Amnesty International, 2022).

            Additionally, the living conditions within dorms are just as horrid as working conditions outside. Workers tend to live in dirty, cramped, unsafe accommodations (Amnesty International, 2021). Indeed, Amnesty found men sleeping in bunk beds in rooms of eight or more people, although Qatari law and the Workers’ Welfare Standards allow for a maximum of four beds per room and prohibit bed sharing and the use of bunk beds (Amnesty International, 2021).

           When workers are bold enough to complain about their conditions and human rights transgressions they are met with strong threats from their employers. One migrant worker working at the Khalifa Stadium said that they “went to the company office, telling the manager I wanted to go home [back to my country] because always my pay is late. The manager screamed at me saying ‘keep working or you will never leave!’” (Amnesty International, 2021). Mohammad, who maintains green spaces in the Aspire Zone, said, “The company has my passport. If my sponsorship status changes they will send me back and I have a lot of debt to pay…, I want my passport back… [and] the camp is no good, there are eight of us in one room – it is too many. But I cannot complain [because] they will end my job.” (Amnesty International, 2021). Couple this with the fact that migrant-worker trade unions are illegal and therefore one cannot organize, protest, nor strike against their employers’ hopeless system of control, exploitation, and abuse—migrant workers in Qatar cannot strike for their basic human rights. Workers who refuse to work because of their conditions are threatened with pay deductions, or get handed to the police for deportation without receiving the pay they are owed (Amnesty International, 2022).

           These Migrant workers overwhelmingly arrive from poorer countries such as India, Nepal, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Ghana, and Kenya (Worden, 2022), leave their country behind for years in hopes of providing a better future for their children. As Gianni Infantino once said, “Qatar is offering migrants the opportunity to provide for their families, whereas Europe has closed its borders,” adding elsewhere in the press conference that he would compensate workers and their families who faced abuse and death while building the World Cup stadiums (Goodman & Worden, 2022). However, there is no indication that the legacy fund will go to any of the thousands of families who lost their fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons to Qatar’s brutal working regime. Furthermore, Qatar forbids the press freedom necessary to investigate migrant labour abuses, making it nearly impossible to document and track death and abuse as a result of the World Cup construction (Goodman & Worden, 2022). Qatar has also refused to do autopsies on workers who have died; if officials claim the deaths were “natural causes” then they are not obligated under Qatar’s labour law to compensate the families (Worden, 2022).

           Importantly, all of these violations occur against a larger backdrop of intense LGBTQ+ discrimination. Homosexuality is illegal in Qatar and as recently as this past September, Qatari security forces arrested and abused LGBTQ+ people in detention (Goodman & Worden, 2022). The teams of England, Wales, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland announced that their captains will no longer be wearing armbands in support of LGBTQ rights during the World Cup, since tournament organizer FIFA promised to sanction any players who wear the bands (Goodman & Worden, 2022).  Qatar also has a male-guardianship system which shows discrimination and a lack of rights for the women of Qatar as well.

           Some of the saddest cases that Human Rights Watch have seen regard families wherein the main breadwinner, a young man, goes to Qatar, takes out a loan to work there, works in debt bondage, gets cheated of wages, does not receive the wages he was promised, and then has his body returned home to his family in a coffin (Goodman & Worden, 2022).

           The following is a statement from former Qatar migrant worker, Hari, featured in a “report” by Human Rights Watch: “When I went to Lusail in Qatar, there was nothing. There wasn’t even a single building. Now there are towers everywhere. We built those towers. In the heat, we worked out of compulsion with face covers. We were drenched in sweat. We poured water, sweat, from our shoes. Even in that heat, we worked hard. My son did not recognize me when I first came from Qatar to Nepal…I met my son only five times in the 14 years I was away. I used to cry and feel bad that I had to stay away from children for work” (HRW, 2022).

           A following statement from Nanda Kali Nepali, whose husband was one of those deaths: “My husband used to work as a driver. He used to come for two months every two years. This time, only his dead body came, four years after he had last visited Nepal. What would he say? He used to say, “I will work here ’til I can. We have loans we need to repay.” My husband was my source of support. Without him, who do I rely on? I sit and I cry on my own. Whom can I show my tears to?” (HRW, 2022)

           Although FIFA regards themselves as “not the police of the world” (Worden, 2022), they were entirely aware of the Kafala system in Qatar along with Qatar’s position on social issues, but none the less granted them the contract while turning a blind eye to the severe human rights abuses, presenting them as a strong ally and friend to the international governing body of FIFA.

Bibliography

A. I. (2021, July 29). Qatar World Cup of Shame. Amnesty International. Retrieved November 27, 2022, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/03/qatar-world-cup-of-shame/

A. I. (2022, October 20). Reality check: Migrant workers’ rights in QatarA. Amnesty International. Retrieved November 27, 2022, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/02/reality-check-migrant-workers-rights-with-two-years-to-qatar-2022-world-cup/

H. R. W. (2022, November 19). Qatar: FIFA World Cup opens without remedy for migrants. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved November 27, 2022, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/19/qatar-fifa-world-cup-opens-without-remedy-migrants

H. R. W. (2022, November 21). Qatar: Rights abuses stain FIFA World Cup. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved November 27, 2022, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/14/qatar-rights-abuses-stain-fifa-world-cup

Goodman, A., & Worden, M. (2022, November 21). World Cup in Qatar is “deadliest major sporting event” in history, built on a decade of forced labor. Democracy Now! Retrieved November 27, 2022, from https://www.democracynow.org/2022/11/21/fifa_world_cup_qatar_labor_rights

Pattisson, P., & McIntyre, N. (2021, February 23). Revealed: 6,500 migrant workers have died in Qatar since World Cup awarded. The Guardian. Retrieved November 27, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/23/revealed-migrant-worker-deaths-qatar-fifa-world-cup-2022

Worden, M. (2022, August 23). The World Cup is exciting, lucrative, and deadly. Newsweek. Retrieved November 27, 2022, from https://www.newsweek.com/world-cup-exciting-lucrative-deadly-opinion-1735799.

YouTube. (2022). Fifa/Qatar: Compensate Migrant Workers for Abuses. YouTube. Retrieved November 27, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzjdQe8Ypkk.

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The Right to Post, Like and Share

Posted on March 20, 2022 | Leave a comment

By: Peter Xavier Rossetti

In the twenty-first century, the internet has become a vital method of communication. Most
people use it to receive information, socialise and express personal feelings, emotions and/or
concerns on an abundance of issues to a wide audience. It is these attributes that create the
internet’s enabling nature. The idea that the internet is a place of limitless connections and we,
as its users, are limitless by extension, has helped mould it into a cornerstone in popular culture.
Ultimately, it has become a very hard thing to live without and yet that is exactly the reality many
Iranians will come to face.

The government of Iran has a complicated history with suppressing access to the internet and
consequently the freedoms of expression, association and information. From the early 1990s to
the mid 2000s Iranians enjoyed free access to the internet without much government
intervention or overreach (Alimardani, 2021). It was only until the presidential election of 2009
did the fate of free and unrestricted internet access in Iran change for the worse. After winning
re-electron through widely suspected voter fraud the returning President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad sought to crack down on all anti-government, anti-Islamic and reformist/regime
change rhetoric being spread across the internet in Iran (Alimardani, 2021). What resulted was
a decade of off-and-on again bans and restrictions placed on Western media and internet
services such as Youtube, Twitter and Facebook (Alimardani, 2021). Since 2009, there seems
to have never been a time where Iranians once again enjoyed free and uncensored access to
the internet like they had previously. Yet somehow, the situation may have further worsened.

In July 2021, the government of Iran moved forward with a certain piece of troubling legislature.
When first made public it had been officially titled by Iranian parliament as the “Cyberspace
Users Rights Protection and Regulation of Key Online Services Bill” and was seen by many
observers as another effort to further censor and control internet access in Iran (Committee to
Protect Journalists, 2021). Concerns over access to the internet, journalism and certain
individual freedoms due to this bill were presented to the government but all proved futile. This
disturbing bill, roughly half a year later, is now well on its way to being passed into formal and
official Iranian law.

As of the time of writing the bill is now called “Regulatory System of Online Services Bill” but is
commonly referred to as the “Protection Bill”. Sadly, this new name did not entail a change in
structure as the complete nature of the bill is just as terrifying as it was originally predicted to be.
Firstly, the bill will prohibit and ban any foriegn internet service that does not maintain physical
representation in Iran itself (Article 19, 2021). What this does is essentially block American
internet services which cannot have an official presence in Iran due to US sanctions. The bill
also encourages Iranians to use locally provided internet services only and criminalises the
creation, distribution and usage of VPNs (Article 19, 2021). These two parts of the bill go
hand-in-hand. By making VPNs illegal the government is forcing Iranians to strictly use
Iran-based services if they want to access the internet. Yet perhaps the most frightening
features of the bill are the last two. The government will require Iranians to use their real, legal
identity when accessing the internet and most internet infrastructure will be overseen by the
Iranian Armed Forces (Article 19, 2021). With online anonymity completely extinguished the
public will be forced to censor themselves. This is especially true if they know the army is
constantly motoring what they say and do on the internet.

The “Protection Bill” has been condemned by many organisations, namely the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In an official statement
published at the beginning of March 2022, the OHCHR denounced the bill. The statement
claimed that the “Protection Bill” would isolate Iran from the global internet and cited concerns
about the restrictions on the free flow of information in and out of the country the bill would
inevitably cause (OHCHR, 2022). Both cases brought up by the statement are of equal
legitimate concern yet the bill is still set to pass in mid-March 2022 and the Iranian government
is seemingly unheeding to international criticism. The future of the internet and Iran is no doubt
in trouble.

The implications of the “Protection Bill” will be detrimental not only to many of the rights and
freedoms of Iranians but also the nature of the internet itself. For a while now it has been difficult
for Iranians to advocate for change over the internet but this bill will be the final nail in the coffin.
By pacifying Iranians internet access the government is actively destroying what the internet is
supposed to do. It is ultimately a service intended to connect people and help bring ideas
together for further development. Without unrestricted access to the internet none of this is
possible. The death of free internet access in Iran is not only a disgusting betrayal of human
rights but also an attack on the internet itself.

References:

  1. Alimardani, Masha. “New “Protection” Bill on Internet Freedom.” The Iran Primer. October 14, 2021. Updated February 23, 2022.
    https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/oct/14/internet-freedom-iran-and-new-protection-bill
  2. “Iran’s parliament moves forward with troubling bill to further restrict internet.” Committee to
    Protect Journalists. November 1, 2021.
    https://cpj.org/2021/11/iran-parliament-bill-restrict-internet/
  3. “Iran: Parliament’s “Protection Bill” will hand over complete control of the Internet to authorities.”
    Article 19. August 5, 2021.
    https://www.article19.org/resources/iran-parliaments-protection-bill-will-hand-over-compl
    ete-control-of-the-internet-to-authorities/
  4. “UN human rights experts urge Iran to abandon restrictive internet bill.” Office of the United
    Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. March 1, 2022.
    https://www.ohchr.org/SP/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=28176&LangI
    D=E

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A Call for a Stronger Response to Russian Aggression in Ukraine

Posted on March 20, 2022 | Leave a comment

By: Hero Aiken

War is evil. The consequences of war are unequivocally atrocious and
unimaginably far-reaching. Monuments are destroyed, families are torn apart,
precious human lives are lost. No one escapes war unscathed. Amnesty
International does not support war. I, like many others, am fundamentally a pacifist,
and abhor war and armed conflict in all cases. Amnesty International does, however,
support “freedom from mental and physical violence” as well as “freedom of
conscience and expression” (Candlelight U of T). My agreement with this second
tenet compels me to present my argument for the armed intervention of NATO in the
Russian invasion of Ukraine, because I feel that the war in Ukraine will not end until
Putin is forced to retreat from Ukrainian land. To this end, I will dispel a common
justification for the nonparticipation of NATO troops in the conflict.

I am against the development and continuation of the war in Ukraine. That
said, because Putin’s aggression and greed are what caused the invasion to begin, it
is impossible to achieve this aim without forcing his retreat from Ukraine’s sovereign
territory. The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine is an all-too familiar scene. In an
unfortunate turn of events, the only way to stop the war in Ukraine is to briefly
escalate tensions by forcibly expelling Russian troops from Ukrainian territory to
restore peace in Europe and around the world. This is not Putin’s first foray into
Ukrainian sovereign territory. In 2014, he annexed and occupied the Ukrainian region
of Crimea. At the time, sanctions were launched by the United States, the European
Union, and other international organisations against individuals, businesses and
officials from Russia. Despite this, Russia maintained control of this Ukrainian region.
It is clear from this example that sanctions, while admirable and useful, are
insufficient to deter Vladimir Putin’s aggression towards Ukraine.

When Russian troops crossed the border into Ukraine on February 24th 2022,
they renewed a brazen attack on the sovereignty of that country, as well as the
safety and human rights of its citizens. The European and African unions, individual
countries, NATO, as well as the United Nations have all condemned the Russian
Federation’s illegal attack on Ukraine in the strictest terms. The Canadian
Government called on the Kremlin to suspend “hostile and provocative actions”,
terming the attack “egregious” and an example of “unwarranted aggression” (Prime
Minister of Canada). There has likewise been an enormous and quasi-unanimous
push towards implementing harsh sanctions on the Kremlin and the oligarchs whose
interests it is said to privilege. These include penalties in the areas of aviation, trade,
energy, private wealth, shipping, media and technology (Reuters). This amounts to
an escalation of the tactics employed by the West following the 2014 attack on
Ukraine, but it is clear that sanctions alone have not been enough to stem the
violence which has been constant since the initial incursion.

When Russian troops crossed the border into Ukraine on February 24th 2022,
they renewed a brazen attack on the sovereignty of that country, as well as the
safety and human rights of its citizens. The European and African unions, individual
countries, NATO, as well as the United Nations have all condemned the Russian
Federation’s illegal attack on Ukraine in the strictest terms. The Canadian
Government called on the Kremlin to suspend “hostile and provocative actions”,
terming the attack “egregious” and an example of “unwarranted aggression” (Prime
Minister of Canada). There has likewise been an enormous and quasi-unanimous
push towards implementing harsh sanctions on the Kremlin and the oligarchs whose
interests it is said to privilege. These include penalties in the areas of aviation, trade,
energy, private wealth, shipping, media and technology (Reuters). This amounts to
an escalation of the tactics employed by the West following the 2014 attack on
Ukraine, but it is clear that sanctions alone have not been enough to stem the
violence which has been constant since the initial incursion.

Western leaders have implicitly stated that NATO troops will not be sent into
Ukraine to oppose Russian forces out of concern for the safety of their countries, and
in order to avoid an escalation to the violence. Joe Biden opposed the presence of
American troops in Ukraine as that would be “a world war when Americans and
Russia start shooting at one another” (CNN). Unfortunately, Ukrainians don’t have
the luxury of choosing to stay uninvolved for their safety. 81% of Canadians support
the actions which Trudeau and his cabinet have already taken with regard to
Russia’s attack on Ukraine (Global News). So far, this includes assistance for
Ukrainian refugees, economic sanctions levelled at Russia and Russian oligarchs,
and the sending of lethal military equipment to aid Ukraine’s defensive efforts
(Government of Canada). Despite this, only 39% of Canadians support the direct
involvement of Canadian troops in this conflict, something which is predicated on
NATO’s involvement (Global News). Although it cannot be doubted that the above
sanctions are effective and important, they have been proven painfully unsuccessful
at avoiding war in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian people are refused military intervention
even as they suffer at the hands of the Russian invasion. Hundreds of Ukrainian
civilians are dead, including many children. In the face of this tragedy, the potential
danger posed to our Western nations cannot be enough to dismiss sending military
support to Ukraine. If the West refuses to “escalate tensions”, Putin will. And this to
the detriment of innocent Ukrainians.

If Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has taught us anything, it is that he will
not be placated. If his troops take Kyiv, it will only be a matter of time before he
targets Moldova or Poland, or any number of neighbouring nations. Because of this,
it is not only unfair of NATO and its allies to refuse to send troops out of a concern for
their own sovereignty, it is also illogical. If Putin is allowed to continue his march on
Ukraine, it will become a march on Europe. Poland, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia… These are all NATO powers which border on Russia or its ally of Belarus.
NATO countries will not be spared violence by allowing Russia’s government to
occupy Ukraine. Russia will gain land, resources and momentum, and NATO will still
have to defend its member states when Putin decides he is not satisfied with
Ukraine, as he was not satisfied with Crimea in 2014.

For these two reasons, it is both unjustifiable and illogical for NATO to refrain
from sending troops into Ukraine to repel Russian forces. Doing so is not only
callous, when Ukrainians cannot choose safety through non interference, but also
useless, because it is clear that Putin will continue to threaten NATO and its allies
through his potential revised position as occupier of Ukraine. Therefore, in order to
avoid further war and in both Ukraine and neighbouring countries, it is imperative
that NATO send troops to the defence of Ukrainian sovereignty. It must be made
clear to Putin, and to all other oligarchical and authoritarian regimes, that peace in
Europe and around the world is critical to ensuring “freedom from mental and
physical violence” as well as “freedom of conscience and expression”, and that those
who seek to infringe upon it will not be given the leeway to do so. Though it may
seem oxymoronic, the above exposes the escalation of tensions in Ukraine as the
swiftest course to peace.

References:

  1. Boynton, Sean. “Canadians Support Actions against Russia over Ukraine, but Have
    Economic Concerns: Poll – National.” Global News, Global News, 11 Mar.
    2022, globalnews.ca/news/8674701/ukraine-russia-canada-ipsos-poll/.
  2. CANDLELIGHT, amnesty.sa.utoronto.ca/about/our-chapter-2/.
  3. Canada, Global Affairs. “Government of Canada.” GAC, Government of Canada, 10
    Mar. 2022,
    www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internati
    onales/sanctions/russia-russie.aspx?lang=eng.
  4. “Statement by the Prime Minister on Russia’s Attack on Ukraine.” Prime Minister of
    Canada,
    pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2022/02/23/statement-prime-minister-russias-att
    ack-ukraine.
  5. “Tracking Sanctions against Russia.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters,
    graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/SANCTIONS/byvrjenzmve/.
  6. Wolf, Zachary B. “Here’s What Biden Has Said about Sending US Troops to
    Ukraine.” CNN, Cable News Network, 24 Feb. 2022,
    www.cnn.com/2022/02/24/politics/us-troops-ukraine-russia-nato/index.html.

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