Category Archives: AIUofT Candlelight

Inhibiting or Protecting? – Questioning the Politics of the Notwithstanding Clause

Posted on February 23, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Tia DeRuiter

In November of 2022, as negotiations over wages and contracts stalled with Ontario education workers, Premier Doug Ford elected to invoke Section 33 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). Also known as the notwithstanding clause, this section of the Charter allows for parliamentary powers in Canada to negate other Charter rights when legislating, for a five-year period (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). In addition, once utilized, this clause eliminates the potential for, and dismisses any objections to the legislation brought forth at the judicial level (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). In Ford’s most recent use of Section 33, he sought to prevent the strike of educational workers, after bargaining with the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) failed to reach a mutual agreement (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). By invoking this clause, Ford, in effect, restricted the right of peaceful assembly, as codified in Section 2 of the Charter (Government of Canada, n.d.b).

Originally intended to distribute power equally among the federal and provincial levels, in recent years, the use of the notwithstanding clause has been questioned by human and civil rights organizations in Canada (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). Though this Section is meant to be invoked in challenging times, many provincial assemblies have begun to utilize this clause more frequently, and often not for its intended circumstances (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). As this clause is ultimately a violation of the rights of Canadians, many scholars and activists have called for its abrogation, and identified its overuse by provincial parliaments (Serebrin, 2022; Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022).

In Ontario, this clause has been called on three times by Doug Ford and his government, though was only enacted twice (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). The first of which was in June of 2021, when Ford utilized Section 33 to limit election funding by third party sources, after his original implementation of the legislation was overruled by an Ontarian judge (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). Though it was argued that this restriction of funding sought to eliminate outside influence in the provincial election, some argued it was ultimately a restriction of free speech (The Canadian Press, 2021).

Though Ford’s use of Section 33 is certainly troubling for the rights it restricts, it also is not the most blatant nor severe use of this policy to date. Many other provincial governments have utilized this clause to rescind Charter rights, such as the right to freedom of religion (Government of Canada, n.d.a). In 2019, the Government of Quebec passed the controversial and highly opposed Bill 21, that bans public employees from donning religious symbols while at work (Rukavina, 2022). Including hijabs, turbans, and any other religious wear, this bill, in effect, has targeted many of Quebec’s minority groups, and accordingly, has had horrific consequences (Rukavina, 2022). Not only has this legislation passed under the notwithstanding clause taken a large step backwards in religious and personal autonomy, but has, according to the Association for Canadian Studies, led to steep increases in hate speech and violence against these communities (Rukavina, 2022). Though in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, the Quebec government’s discriminatory and exclusive policy may persist with the protection Section 33 confers. Further, in 2000, the notwithstanding clause was also invoked in Alberta, to make changes to the province’s Marriage Act, and lay out a definition that saw marriage as an act that should only occur between a man and a woman (Mckay-Panos, 2018). Though not renewed after the clause’s five-year period, this too posed severe limitations on Albertan’s rights guaranteed by the Charter at that time (Mckay-Panos, 2018).

Though established with good intentions, the notwithstanding clause appears to have evolved as a weapon wielded by provincial governments to restrict the rights of Canadian citizens. Alongside concerns over the use of Section 33 comes calls to eliminate its existence from the Charter, for the injustices it has both enabled, and has the power to permit. Human and civil rights groups alike have begun these calls, such as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, believing that this policy must be reversed to protect the very rights upon which the clause infringes (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). While the repeal of this clause is highly improbable, it is nevertheless important to direct attention to, and call into question the invocation of a Charter section being used to inhibit rights, as opposed to protecting them. Ultimately, as Wherry elucidates, this clause allows the rights and freedoms of the majority to be dictated and controlled by the majority and those in power, which is contrary to the nature of the human rights Canada claims to defend (2022).

Works Cited

Government of Canada. (n.d.a). Section 2(a) – Freedom of religion. Government of Canada. https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art2a.html

Government of Canada. (n.d.b). Section 2(c) – Freedom of peaceful assembly. Government of Canada. https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art2c.html

Mckay-Panos, L. (2018, November 2). Effects of the notwithstanding clause on human rights. LawNow. https://www.lawnow.org/effects-of-the-notwithstanding-clause-on-human-rights/

Rukavina, S. (2022, August 4). New research shows Bill 21 having ‘devastating’ impact on religious minorities in Quebec. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/bill-21-impact-religious-minorities-survey-1.6541241

Serebrin, J. (2022, May 29). Quebec’s use of notwithstanding clause in language law opens constitutional debate. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-notwithstanding-clause-constitutional-debate-1.6470091

The Canadian Press. (2021, June 14). Ford government pushes through controversial election spending bill with notwithstanding clause. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/notwithstanding-clause-vote-ontario-1.6064952

Wherry, A. (2022, June 1). The case for making the notwithstanding clause politically awkward again. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/charter-rights-notwithstanding-clause-constitution-1.6472317#content

Zimonjic, P., & Chevalier, J. (2022, November 6). The notwithstanding clause – what it is, why it was used and what happens next. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/notwithstanding-clause-explained-ford-1.6641293

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A Glimpse of Russia’s North: Indigenous Resistance and the Rise of the Voice of the Tundra

Posted on February 23, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Pengyu Chen

The Voice of the Tundra (Golos tundry) is an activist community on Russia’s media platform, “V Kontakte,” which represents the voices of Arctic Indigenous peoples in Russia’s Northwest Yamal Peninsula. Organized by and under the leadership of Nenets reindeer breeder Eiko Sérotétto, this local activism emerged in response to the state’s ongoing and intensifying industrialization in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YaNAO). Specifically, Golos tundry is concerned about environmental degradation, loss of land to extractivist industries, impoverishment of traditional Indigenous lifestyle, and state curtailment of Indigenous political organization.


As political scientist Arbakhan K. Magomedov recently noted, as a result of the state’s push for accelerated industrial development in YaNAO, the social tension between the Indigenous peoples of this region, the Nenets tundra aborigines, and the state and businesses have been “pushed to the limit” (Magomedov 220). The Russian government has turned the YaNAO into its “new oil-and-gas province” at the expense of the habitat and Indigenous way of life (Magomedov 216). Relying on Magomedov’s research, this article brings to light some of the material and political challenges the Indigenous peoples of this intensely industrialized region face.


Similar to Indigenous struggles against settler colonial states in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere, Indigenous peoples of the Nenets tundra perceive themselves as struggling against the Kremlin’s extensive encroachment of their land and aggressive deprivation of the Indigenous way of life. This social change and tension were triggered by the state’s industrial development plans as early as 2009. The Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug has been experiencing extraordinary transformative changes in its resource-extraction capacity compared to other regions in the last decade (Magomedov 220). In September 2009, the then-premier of the Russian government, Vladimir Putin, declared during a conference in Salekhard that “The fields discovered on the peninsula can and must become our new oil-and-gas province” (Magomedov 220). Numerous industrial large-scale development projects soon followed. For example, the massive gas project Bovanenkovskoe was launched in 2012, and it was followed in 2013 by the construction of the USD$27 billion “Yamal LNG” (Liquefied Natural Gas) project, which consists of the production, liquefaction, and delivery of gas at the Yuzhno-Tambeiskii field. Additionally, the “Arctic LNG-2” project is set to launch this year. As of 2019, there were about sixty oil-and-gas companies (Magomedov 226).


These industrial development projects of the past decade have altered the natural landscape within Indigenous communities. For example, large areas previously used by Nenets for breeding and grazing reindeer are now occupied by oil-and-gas companies to extract, store, and transport natural resources. At least 6 percent of the land previously used by the locals for grazing is in the grip of the “Yamal LNG” project in Sabett (Magomedov 226-227). Eleven million hectares of land are in the hands of “Gazprom,” the partially state-owned multinational energy corporation (Magomedov 227). Infrastructure of all sorts, from gas pipelines to airfields and highways to settlements, had led to “the further contamination and degeneration of tundra expanses” (Magomedov 227). A significant amount of water surface area has been siphoned for the port of Sabetta, and a large amount of the Gulf of Ob’s aquatic area has been claimed for oil-and-gas industries (Magomedov 277). All of these industrial developments contribute to making the resources and land scarce for Nenets, contributing to the emergence of the Golos tundry.


Moreover, Indigenous peoples’ material well-being is at stake. Because economic actors are unwilling to give up these oil-and-gas industries, which contribute to the region’s economic growth and revenue, it is impossible for oil-and-gas companies to return former Indigenous kin-group land. Nenets, therefore, cannot access their land for breeding and grazing their reindeer. Many Yamal reindeer breeders expressed that they will face a depletion of land for reindeer husbandry, the threatened starvation and malnutrition of reindeer, and, as a result, loss of income (Magomedov 224).


In fact, the acute social tension between the Nenets and oil-and-gas companies is exacerbated by the disruptive intersection between the large-scale industrial complex and the largest reindeer herd in Russia (Magomedov 226). Natural disasters further exacerbate this predicament. For example, in the winter of 2013-14, about 90,000 reindeer perished due to a severe ice storm, and, in the spring of 2018, many more perished from a cold spring and an ice storm in addition to the shortage of grazing lands (Magomedov 232). Neither the state nor industrial enterprises compensate for these losses, although they are responsible for excluding reindeer breeders from using the land. Many reindeer breeders indicated to Magomedov that “an atmosphere of living on the edge, frequent environmental and natural cataclysms, and persistent risks have created an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear for tomorrow” (233-234).


Another pressing concern of the Indigenous peoples is the absence of leadership and formal representation in the system. There is a lack of statistical representation of Indigenous concerns. According to Magomedov, because the social interests of the Indigenous peoples and organizations are inherently contradictory from the alliance between the state and the capital, “the authorities are not going to support such research, as this threatens the reputation and status of the official Indigenous organizations supported by the state” (231).


In his interview with many Nenets, Magomedov notes that the“existing official Indigenous organizations and leaders are not defending the rights and interests of aborigines” (231). Seventy percent of the respondents expressed that they would “count only on themselves, friends, and relatives,” while 17 percent of them responded that they could rely on the help of “organizations and civic movements representing the interests of the region’s Indigenous peoples,” and only 13 percent of the respondents believe they can rely on “local, okrug, and federal organs of power (Magomedov 231).


This reality reflects the severity of the state’s curtailment of Indigenous organizations. While its activity was suspended in late 2012 by the Russian government, the Association of Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East (RAIPON), which represents the interests of about 300,000 Indigenous peoples, was reinstated in March 2013 with government pressures to reorganize its leadership in a new direction (Magomedov 221). The current elected president, Grigorii Ledkov, is a pro-government United Russia member and State Duma deputy (Magomedov 221). According to Magomedov, this change of leadership seemed forced. The loyal president Sergei Khariuchi was removed, and so were two brothers, Rodion and Pavel Suliandziga, who acted as vice presidents. The latter, Pavel Suliandziga, emigrated to the United States in 2017 because he was subjected to state persecution (Magomedov 241).


The Nenets ethnographer and anthropologist Galina Khariuchi remarked on the Kremlin’s encroachment of Indigenous organizations and Indigenous lands: “I compare the current situation with the 1990s. Then we were deciding our fate ourselves. We freely spoke out and argued at congresses. These days everything is written out for us. Now only delegates can be present at congresses of organizations of Indigenous peoples; they don’t allow ordinary people” (Magomedov 222). For Sergei Khariuchi, this change was not only a “new extensive turn towards industrialization of northern territories” but also the reflection that “[Indigenous peoples] are one of the last barriers standing in the way of companies and states in the extraction of these resources” (Magomedov 222).


Worse, according to Magomedov, the state has double-downed on Indigenous activism in the Okrug. In response to increasing Indigenous activism—the politicization of Indigenous and environmental issues—the authorities of the Okrug perceived it as a “subversive activity” and accused the reindeer breeders of “waging an information war” (Magomedov 235). They also declare Golos tundry as “foreign agents” (Magomedov 235). Furthermore, the director of the YaNAO department of internal policy, Sergei Kliment’ev, declared in the regional parliament that “a stress point is being artificially created in the region, to create a new political reality,” indicating that the concerns of Indigenous peoples are falsely exaggerated (Magomedov 235).


Despite the state’s effort to curtail its movement, Golos tundry continues to raise awareness of its predicament on social media platforms (https://vk.com/golos_tundry) in tandem with the region’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). The leader, Eiko Sérotétto, established a political alliance with CPRF to contend with the Kremlin, becoming the authorized representative of Pavel Grudinin (Putin’s political opponent in the 2018 presidential elections) and, in 2018, a candidate for deputy to the regional parliament as a member of the CPRF (Magomedov 237). Sérotétto expressed his motivation for becoming a deputy: “I am troubled by the poverty and lack of protection of the Yamal’s Indigenous population, the reduction in the size of the reindeer herds and fishery resources. I am worried by the issue of preserving the nature of the tundra. This is our home, we must safeguard it for future generations.”


All of the above is but a glimpse of Russia’s North. As Magomedov’s research shows, political contestation and negotiation between the alliance of the state and capital and local Indigenous peoples have been “pushed to the limit.” And here in this article, I invite the reader to take a step back (but not look away) from the well-covered and hotly discussed ongoing Russo-Ukraine war and learn about the less-talked-about state intervention and capital accumulation in Russia’s peninsula.

Work Cited


Magomedov, Arbakhan. “How the Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Arctic Defend Their Interests: The Social, Economic, and Political Foundations of Indigenous Resistance.” Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia, vol. 58, no. 4, 16 Nov. 2019, pp. 215–245., https://doi.org/10.1080/10611959.2020.1811560.

See also:
Kharyuchi, Galina. “Sacred Places in the Nenets Traditional Culture.” Sibirica, vol. 17, no. 3, Dec. 2018, p. 116–137., https://doi.org/10.3167/sib.2018.170310.

Liarskaya, Elena V. “Settlement Nenets on the Yamal Peninsula: Who Are They?” Folklore: Electronic Journal of Folklore, vol. 41, Apr. 2009, pp. 33–46., https://doi.org/10.7592/fejf2009.41.liarskaya.

Magomedov, Arbakhan K. “Oil Derricks or Reindeer? A Clash of Economics and Traditional Lifeway in Russia’s Far North.” Wilson Center, 22 Feb. 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/oil-derricks-or-reindeer-clash-economics-and-traditional-lifeway-russias-far-north.

Mirovalev, Mansur. “In Russia, Indigenous Land Defenders Face Intimidation and Exile.” Indigenous Rights | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 23 Jan. 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/1/23/in-russia-indigenous-land-defenders-face-intimidation-and-exile.

Staalesen, Atle. “In Russian Tundra Tragedy, up to 80,000 Reindeer Might Have Starved to Death.” The Independent Barents Observer, 3 Mar. 2021, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/climate-crisis/2021/03/russian-tundra-tragedy-80000-reindeer-might-have-starved-death.

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Indian Prime Minister Modi Bans BBC Documentary While Allegations of Human Rights Violations Still Mount

Posted on February 16, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Nesane Nakanthiran

On January 17, the BBC aired a documentary detailing the rise of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and it closely connected the political figure to the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in the Western state of Gujarat, which constituted one of the worst outbreaks of religious violence in recent Indian history.  Subsequently, the Indian government imposed an emergency law which banned the documentary and any of its screenings—even in universities. Unsurprisingly, heavy policing and brutal arrests took place across several campuses as students began protesting against the ban.

As leader of the Hindu nationalist, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India’s largest right-wing party, PM Modi has been haunted for decades due to his inaction and complicity throughout the riots, although he still refuses to take proportionate accountability.

In fact, this was not his first time using the emergency law, nor his first time facing allegations of violating human rights. International human rights organizations and advocates have long been calling upon European leaders to address Modi’s “growing abuses and discriminatory policies” (Molander 2022). For example, BJP-led states have seen increasing illegal demolitions of Muslim properties, while Indian authorities have seen a heavy crackdown on students, journalists, civil society, human rights activists, and others who prove either critical towards the state or work to defend human rights amongst vulnerable communities (Molander 2022). Indeed, PM Modi even sanctions the increased use of intrusive technologies, such as Israeli-produced spyware, to curtail human rights and freedom of expression —a decision which proves unsurprising from the BJP leader.

The 2002 anti-Muslim riots took place in response to the burning of a train carrying Hindu pilgrims. Local citizens had blamed the 59 deaths on Gujarat’s Muslims, which led to instances of religious violence claiming over 1,000 lives. At the time, Modi was the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat, and thus, Muslim criticisms against the current Indian PM are substantial. Furthermore, police are accused of standing by while Modi faced such criticisms, perhaps even supporting Hindu extremists throughout the riots. Specifically, the documentary highlights an “unpublished report from the U.K. Foreign Office that claims Modi was ‘directly responsible’ for the ‘climate of impunity’ that enabled the violence” (Syed 2023), despite the leader’s supporters citing a 2013 Supreme Court ruling “insufficient evidence to prosecute.”

PM Modi is not alone in facing immense backlash for his use of censorship. By invoking emergency laws on Twitter and YouTube, Twitter CEO and self-proclaimed saviour of free speech, Elon Musk, has come under criticism for carrying out acts which proved contradictory to his public campaign against censorship throughout his Twitter takeover. To be clear, emergency laws extend government censorship over social media companies, which would explain how Twitter and YouTube had their hands tied. Yet, this does not diminish the Indian government’s violations against democracy, free speech, and human rights—rather, it only further substantiates the dangers of granting unchecked authority over media to a powerful few.

Currently, the emergency law remains enforced across Twitter and YouTube, and Indian police continue to crack down on illegal screenings of the documentary.

Works Cited

Ellis-Petersen, Hannah. 2023. “India invokes emergency laws to ban BBC Modi documentary.” The Guardian, January 23, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/23/india-emergency-laws-to-ban-bbc-narendra-modi-documentary

Hussain, Murtaza and Ryan Grim. 2023. “Elon Musk Caves to Pressure from India to Remove BBC Doc Critical of Modi.” The Intercept, January 24, 2023. https://theintercept.com/2023/01/24/twitter-elon-musk-modi-india-bbc/

Molander, Måns. 2022. “European Leaders Should Raise Human Rights Concerns with Modi.” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/european-leaders-should-raise-human-rights-concerns-modi

Syed, Armani. 2023. “India Banned a BBC Documentary Critical of Modi. Here’s How People Are Watching Anyway.” Time, January 26, 2023. https://time.com/6250480/bbc-modi-documentary-skirting-censors/

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Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy

Posted on February 14, 2023 | Leave a comment

By Laura Moldoveanu

Canada has had a nearly six-year commitment to feminist foreign policy, with the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FAIP) announced on June 9th, 2017 as a means of rendering Canada into a global leader in women’s empowerment. Though it is a somewhat overlooked and forgotten development, the FAIP substantiates the importance of women’s rights in the international system, thus warranting this article’s assessment of the policy’s context, intent, implementation, success, and issues.

In Canadian society, women face unique adversities to equality, including forced marriage, gender-based violence, fewer education opportunities, legal barriers to work, more familial responsibilities than men, and limited control over reproductive health (Global Affairs Canada, 2021). Essential to Canada’s FAIP is the belief that, by promoting gender equality, the nation may effectively decrease poverty rates. In theory, allowing women greater participation in the economy would increase economic growth in the targeted nation(s), thus concerning Canada as such an investment in assistance would enhance national prosperity. The FAIP was announced after a year of consultation with over fifteen thousand people in sixty-five countries, including several women’s rights groups (Lamensch, 2020). Furthermore, the policy referenced a 2015 plan to reduce poverty and build peace, entitled the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

Six key areas of the policy include gender equality, human dignity, inclusive governance, climate action, peace and security, and “growth that works for everyone” (Global Affairs Canada, 2021). Gender equality involves a sexual violence initiative and engages with differing levels of government to deliver programs supporting women’s rights; human dignity pertains to health and education; governance stresses the importance of political participation; climate action covers loss of resources, such as clean drinking water and renewable energy; peace and security involves women in post-conflict nation-building and peace negotiations; lastly, growth engages with economic and ownership rights. Overall, it is clear that the policy covers a huge range of issues. In one sense, this is beneficial because the policy is not limited, however, it also indicates that the policy lacks a cohesive vision.

Implementation involves investment, innovation, and partnerships. Canada vowed to put fifteen percent of its bilateral international development assistance investments towards gender equality. The policy abandons Canada’s previous “countries-of-focus” approach that concentrated assistance on a small list of countries and, instead, involves a broader range of countries, with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Involvement with multilateral groups such as the UN, G7, and G20—as well as the private sector, for financial assistance—is also a key part of the policy. Finally, civil society organizations such as women’s rights groups are expected to receive one hundred and fifty million dollars to develop programs to help promote gender equality (Global Affairs Canada, 2021).

Turning to real-world results, the official policy website boasts a list of success stories under the subheading “our policy in action.” From setting up community centres in Iraq refugee camps to clearing landmines out of Colombia, the policy seems to live up to its many goals in terms of both mission diversity and cross-global span.

With that being said, however, the policy must also be looked at through a more critical lens. There are contradictions and issues associated with Canadian foreign policy, and feminist foreign policy in particular. Scholars and policy analysts argue that the policy does not include definitions of gender or feminism, leaving out marginalized groups such as intersex or transgender persons (Tiessen, 2019), while also lacking inclusion of LGBTQ+ individuals who may face added discrimination beyond gender. Furthermore, the efficacy of the policy is inhibited by other Canadian foreign policy objectives; for example, while the FAIP promotes the empowerment of female peacekeepers, the Canadian government nonetheless continues in concurrently selling weapons to Saudi Arabia (Bouka, 2021). As for more technical problems, the policy has no clear measures of success or ways to monitor long-term impact.

So, is the policy just performative activism? Canada has made it clear that the government views women’s empowerment as an important area to focus on, with a long-term goal of reducing poverty around the world. With that being said, the current impact and efficacy of the FAIP is a mixed bag. In the coming years, perhaps a revaluation will be needed to judge whether the policy is making any substantial long-term impact on gender equality.

Works Cited

Bouka, Yolande, et al. “Is Canada’s Foreign Policy Really Feminist?” Network for Strategic Analysis , Network for Strategic Analysis , 7 Oct. 2021, https://ras-nsa.ca/publication/is-canadas-foreign-policy-really-feminist-analysis-and-recommend ations/.

“Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy.” Global Affairs Canada. Government of Canada, August 24, 2021. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorit ies-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng.

Lamensch, Marie. “Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy.” The Canadian Encyclopedia. Historica Canada, July 31, 2020. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canada-s-feminist-foreign-policy.

Tiessen, Rebecca. “What’s New About Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy.” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Canadian Global Affairs Institute , Dec. 2019, https://www.cgai.ca/whats_new_about_canadas_feminist_international_assistance_policy_the_ problem_and_possibilities_of_more_of_the_same.

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‘Are you sure? I think you might just be overreacting’: The “Nothingness” of Microaggressions and Brandon Taylor’s ‘Real Life’

Posted on February 9, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Jasmin L.K. Smith

Courtesy of Riverhead Books

Brandon Taylor’s Real Life is a beautiful, silent, creeping story of Black sexuality and the hidden anti-Black aggressions of academia. When I finished this novel, I was at Old Mill Station, sitting on the TTC on my way home from class on a chilly September night, not quite a flashbulb memory, but very close given the impact this story had on me. This is a novel that I will always recommend, and, having faced racism in an academic setting on multiple crushing occasions, it is a novel that brought me to tears. Brandon Taylor’s Real Life is a love letter to every Black academic, acknowledging the frustrating microaggressions deeply embedded into academic structures that often go ignored by our peers, but, more importantly, it is also a love letter to himself.

Brandon Taylor’s debut novel is a novel, seemingly, about nothing. When I had first read the climax, I had to go back and read it over again to confirm that it was, in fact, the climax. I easily fell in love with Taylor’s ability to accurately portray such a multi-dimensional situation, a life being lived; the ‘nothingness’ of the novel was not like watching paint dry, or waiting for water to boil, it was like a walk through the woods at night, hoping and praying for nothing to jump out. It was beautiful and tragic and redeeming, and it felt like, for the first time, I had the words and the stories that I had always been in search of.

Real Life begins with Wallace, the only Black student in his PhD program at a university in Alabama, going to the lake to meet his friends. The scene introduces his group of five, all of which are white PhD students that attend the same school. Throughout the novel, Taylor builds characters that anybody could encounter in their academic career, with the honesty of portraying Wallace as someone that often feels like an outsider within the cliquey dynamic of his friends. 

In the laboratory where he spends much of his time, Wallace is subjected to impatience, frustration, and thinly veiled racism from the other scientists around him. Out of the lab’s characters, Brigit is the only redeemable personality, being a loyal and compassionate friend to Wallace. Much of his time in the lab portrayed in the novel is spent attempting to restart research that had been ruined by Dana, a scientist in the lab that seems to hate Wallace for no reason. Of course, the explanation for Dana’s behavior is much less simple, and her constant attempts to alienate and typecast Wallace make it very obvious that her behaviors are microaggressions. To outsiders, or non-Black people that have never had to see a woman’s knuckles turn white around her purse strap the moment you walk into a room, microaggressions often seem absurd, and they are often dismissed as being a figment of Black imaginations. Being Black, particularly in academia where faculty and peers refuse to acknowledge the elephant in the room, it is unimaginably frustrating to experience the same daily patterns of small, racist acts and get told that they are being imagined. Taylor doesn’t beat around the bush with his depiction of microaggressions, he does not shy away from the frequency of them, nor does he create a magical solution to them for the sake of narrative. As is the nature of microaggressions in real life, nobody believes Wallace when he tries to speak up. Rather than someone recognizing Dana’s behavior as stemming from racism, Wallace is blamed for creating a toxic environment in their lab. 

The microaggressions don’t end at Dana, who non-Black readers could dismiss as being raised in a racist environment or simply hateful of Wallace’s success, but it continues into Wallace’s own friend group. At a dinner party with every single one of his friends– save for Brigit– in attendance, Wallace’s thoughts of leaving his program are openly shut down because of what Roman, a friend of a friend, calls his “deficiencies” (Taylor 109). Prior to using this term, Roman describes how, without his doctorate, Wallace would suffer because of “the prospects for . . . black people” (108). He continues to describe Wallace’s thoughts of leaving as selfish and ungrateful, because Wallace apparently owes his department for even being so gracious as to let him in. The entire table is privy to the conversation between the two of them, but no one says a word, nobody makes any attempt to stand up for Wallace, or address the very obvious racism from Roman. During the encounter, “Wallace can only taste ashes in his mouth,” and reading the scene, I felt much the same (109). Despite the feelings of irreverence that I had towards the characters in Taylor’s constructed world at that moment, I had been in situations entirely too similar, and just as off-putting and disharmonious. 

Wallace’s most poignant relationship is the one that he shares with Miller, a friend of his that swears to be straight in spite of his ongoing affair with Wallace. Miller often downplays the situation between him and Wallace, hiding it away from the world. Wallace is made, as he was in his childhood, to feel dirty, to feel like he is the one to be blamed. Despite the constant, underlying pulse of wanting Miller to do and be better, Miller never changes, he is always the wolf of the fable. What’s worse is Wallace’s easy acceptance of the way he is treated by Miller, and even their other friends; he cannot see himself ever being in the right, he is alway on the offering end of an unneeded apology. 

We, as readers, get to earnestly consider the complexities of Wallace’s grief, having been a victim of his father’s cruelty in the past, and presently refusing to acknowledge that he is even experiencing grief for someone that had cared for him so little. Wallace must reconcile with the fact that he may not fit in at his university, but he may not have fit in during his childhood either. So what does that leave him with? What kind of place can he make for himself with what he has left? Though Wallace may seem like a pushover at some points, throughout the story he allows himself to think the thoughts that scare us too much to examine ourselves. He has spent years of his life in a scientific field, and he has gotten as far as being in a doctorate program, but he is now doubting whether it is something he really wants. After losing so many years of his life on his program, even entertaining the thought of leaving is brave, and it’s not something that many people would consider doing themselves. Wallace is not thinking of quitting because of the difficult dynamics of his program, but because maybe he has spent his entire academic career being driven by the opposite; maybe his academic career wasn’t in spite of others, but to prove that he could survive their spite.

Wallace’s story is painfully relatable and uncompromisingly truthful, and much of that is because it is semi-autobiographical to Taylor’s own life. Taylor himself had been born and raised in Alabama, and he dropped out of his own PhD program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to pursue writing (Wheeler). His own university experiences were often filled with microaggressions and dissonance, well reflected in the progression of Wallace’s story in Real Life. Taylor “didn’t write this book for the white gaze,” he wrote it for people like his “queer, black friends” that felt as if modern campus novels didn’t “represent [them] in any sort of substantive way” (Wheeler). Though the novel does create a digestible framework for non-Black people to understand how deeply racism is embedded into academia, the novel’s purpose is not to educate, it is to show Black students, Black lovers of academia, that their experiences are real and their stories are worth being told. As a Black student, it is incredibly difficult to love an institution that will always be systemically against you, but Taylor understands it, and Wallace lives it. 

Wallace’s struggles throughout Real Life do not fall on opposite ends of a spectrum, they don’t go from a bad hair day to saving the world from an apocalypse, no, Wallace’s problems are mundane; from silent, internal mental health issues, to being on the losing end of a difficult situationship. Wallace has problems that you would hear friends talking about over coffee, or see questions on an advice blog about. In an interview with the writers at the Booker Prize Foundation, Brandon claims “close observation” to be “how [he makes sense] of the world” (Booker Prize Foundation). His concentrated, persistent scrutinization of the regular and mundane creates a story that feels so exacting and sharp that, at points, it feels almost monumental in the way that it encapsulates a life lived. I struggle to find words to describe the various complete and incomplete feelings I was left with at the book’s finish because ‘mundane’ reduces it to something unworthy of a read. Real Life is melancholic, celebratory, validating, and unrelenting, but, above all else, it is honest.

Works Cited

Booker Prize Foundation. “Brandon Taylor Q&A.” The Booker Prizes, 2020, https://thebookerprizes.com/brandon-taylor-interview-real-life.

Taylor, Brandon. (2020). Real Life. Riverhead Books.

Wheeler, André. “’I didn’t write this book for the white gaze’: black queer author Brandon Taylor on his debut novel.” The Guardian, 5 March 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2020/mar/05/brandon-taylor-author-real-life-interview.

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Representation matters: a look into representation of the LGBTQ+ community in The Owl House

Posted on February 7, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Anonymous

Courtesy of Disney

We always say that “representation matters”, but what constitutes good representation of minorities in the media?

Disney’s animated show “The Owl House” was released in 2020 and has received much praise for the diversity in its characters. However, it was announced (not long after its release) that the show will not continue past season 3, as the show “did not fit Disney’s brand”; no official statement was ever released regarding how exactly it deviates from the usual Disney series (Anderton, J, 2021). Though it is saddening to see it end so quickly, The Owl House was truly an amazing show.

There are definitely other examples of good representation, and it is far from perfect, but I chose The Owl House as I believe that representation in children’s media is especially important. Many studies have shown that as children learn by observing their surroundings, they are impressionable and very easily influenced by the media that they consume (“Adolescents and the Media: Medical and Psychological Impact,” 1995). Positive representation of different minority groups in children’s media encourages the younger generation to learn more about different communities, subverting existing stereotypes against certain minority groups.

Therefore, to celebrate the release of the first episode of the last season a few months back, let’s take a look into why I personally believe The Owl House to be a great example of what representation in media should look like.

One of my favourite things about the representation in this show is that they are not simply putting in characters as “token minorities”. More often than not, shows nowadays tend to include minorities as side characters to appear “progressive”; some creators expect praise and credits for doing the bare minimum of having characters of diverse backgrounds. Most of the main characters in The Owl House are canonically queer, which is actually much more common in real life compared to having one “gay best friend” in a heterosexual friend group, so common that many queer people have reported that they tend to “flock together” (Jernigan, C., & Mistree, B. F., 2009). As a result, queer people in the show have different personalities, ethnicities, interests, and style, subverting the stereotypes around the community and emphasising intersectionality.

It is also important to bring up the fact that the show educates young children about different sexualities and genders. Lilith Clawthorne is canonically aromantic and asexual, and Raine Whispers is non binary. These are parts of LGBTQ+ community that is often neglected when it comes to representation in media.

In addition, the show does not focus on how the characters face judgements for being queer, unlike most western media nowadays where nine out of ten times gay characters’ character arc revolves around the fact that they are queer. While the show addresses the struggles the main character, Luz, faces for being “different” or “weird”, she was never judged for being bisexual; a scene that I remember distinctly was that the “mean girl” or bully in the show, Boscha, had always mocked Luz for everything that she does, but never the fact that she is dating another girl, Amity, to which her only comment was “they are not that cute.” (Fun fact: Boscha has two moms.) Another scene I found worthy of note was when Amity’s mother, Odalia, said Luz was unfit for her daughter, and that she would find Amity “a new girlfriend”; even though Odalia is an overall insufferable person and had a questionable parenting style, she did not hold judgement for the fact that Amity is a lesbian. In most western media, typically teen dramas, the above examples would have been a perfect moment to introduce homophobia into the show, per usual; however, The Owl House chose not to and created a world of comfort for its audience. While characters still face many problems in their lives (spoiler alert: the world ending, and all that), being queer seems to be the norm, or at least as common as being cisgender and/or heterosexual in this world.

I believe that the kind of representation in The Owl House, where diversity is celebrated, is much more effective (compared to constantly emphasising on the negativity that queer people face) in educating the younger generation and allowing queer youth feel seen. Not only was diversity in sexuality shown in a sense that there are gay characters, but it was also shown within the community, educating its audience about the “Q+”. All in all, The Owl House did a great job in being truly inclusive of different sexualities and genders, and I can not wait to watch season 3 next year.

Works Cited

1. Adolescents and the media: medical and psychological impact. (1995). Choice Reviews Online, 33(02), 33–0735a. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.33-0735a

2. Anderton, J. (2021, October 9). Owl House boss shares real reason why Disney cancelled the show. Digital Spy. Retrieved December 3, 2022, from https://www.digitalspy.com/tv/ustv/a37915254/owl-house-disney-cancellation-reason/

3. Disney Channel’s ‘The Owl House’ Gets Season 2 Order Ahead of Series Premiere (Exclusive). (2019, November 21). Hollywood Reporter. Retrieved December 4, 2022, from https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/tv/tv-news/disney-channels-owl-house-gets-early-season-2-order-1256811/

4. Jernigan, C., & Mistree, B. F. (2009). Gaydar: Facebook friendships expose sexual orientation. First Monday. https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v14i10.2611

5. Terrance, D. (Director). (2020, January 10). The Owl House. Disney.

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The Wet’suwet’en Pipeline & Canadian-Indigenous Legal Conflict

Posted on February 2, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Juliano Gaglione

Courtesy of CBrentPatterson via Twitter

           Three weeks ago, Amnesty International issued a press release regarding LNG Canada’s Coastal GasLink pipeline, criticizing the Canadian government and Coastal GasLink (CGL) for their continued policing and criminalizing of Indigenous “land defenders”, who protect their territory from pipeline development. A call-to-action pressuring the Canadian government and CGL to allow the “Wet’suwet’en people [to] exercise their rights over their traditional territories” (Amnesty International, 2023) was released, the article addresses a conflict prompting questions of whether the Wet’suwet’en community possesses legal rights to unceded land, whether such rights are acknowledged by the Canadian government, and, more importantly, whether such conflict constitutes a threat towards Canadian-Indigenous legal relations. Through investigation, we’ll find that the Wet’suwet’en do, indeed, possess legitimate claim to unceded territories and that the Canadian government’s infringement of Wet’suwet’en title proves unjustified. Furthermore, the Wet’suwet’en pipeline conflict illustrates an existing incompatibility between Indigenous and Canadian sovereignty, resulting from the Canadian government’s unsurprising exploitation of fiduciary privileges to substantiate their own economic priorities.

A brief overview of the conflict and opposing interests at hand

          The Coastal GasLink is a natural gas pipeline being developed in northern British Columbia, which partially traverses territory belonging to the Wet’suwet’en First Nation community. While all five relevant Wet’suwet’en Nation’s band councils have signed benefit agreements with CGL consenting to the use of their land for pipeline development, the nation chiefs, possessing power within a “hereditary clan system,” refuse to offer such consent. An important distinction is to be made here between an “elected band council,” the form of political leadership endowed upon First Nations communities by Canadian settlers via the Indian Act; and a “hereditary clan system,” the traditional form of political leadership within First Nations communities prior to colonial contact. Claiming to have been granted Aboriginal title (unceded land rights) in the 1997 trial, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (Hernandez, 2020), the hereditary chiefs argue that the unconsensual yet unremitting development of the CGL pipeline is an unjustified land rights violation. As such, many Indigenous land defenders throughout the province have been protesting these proposed injustices by undermining the pipeline’s construction, and establishing roadblocks to prevent project development officials from reaching their sites (Baker, 2022). Meanwhile, standing to earn an estimated twenty-three billion CDN over the span of forty years following the pipeline’s construction, the federal government has largely endorsed the CGL pipeline ever since first commissioning the project in 2018 (Simmons, 2022)—this financial interest at least partially explains the government’s policing contributions towards the project, with RCMP officers consistently tasked with enforcing the law over supposedly criminally-behaved Indigenous protesters (Amnesty International, 2023). With that said, the pipeline is currently—as of the CGL’s latest briefing—beyond 80% complete, and will likely see full completion in the near future regardless of opposition efforts (CGL, 2023).

          Upon inspection of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (3 SCR 1010, 1997)—a supreme court case resulting from Delgamuukw’s appeal of a previously failed trial—it’s clear that the hereditary chiefs of the Wet’suwet’en First Nations were granted Aboriginal title over their territory in 1997, resulting mainly from the chief justice’s reconsideration of the Wet’suwet’en oral tradition, “kungax,” as valid historical evidence of pre-colonial territorial occupation. In remarking upon the original trial, Chief Justice Lamer stated that “the trial judge expected too much of the oral history of the appellants,” and that “if oral history cannot conclusively establish pre-sovereignty occupation of land, it may still be relevant to demonstrate that current occupation has its origins prior to sovereignty” (3 SCR 1010, 1997). Indeed, in the following trial, such oral history would be found sufficient in illustrating a pre-sovereign origin of occupation, granting Aboriginal title to the hereditary chiefs who brought the case to the supreme court. As a result, the Wet’suwet’en chiefs, by possessing Aboriginal title, possess land rights since 1997 characterized as (1) inalienable; (2) recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 1763; (3) communally held; (4) limited in use to actions which are “reconcilable with the nature of the claimants’ attachment to those lands” (i.e., forbidding ecologically negligent land use); and (5) protected by section 35 the Constitution Act of 1982 (3 SCR 1010, 1997). Clearly, then, Wet’suwet’en protestors are correct in their assertion that hereditary chiefs are owed unceded land rights as per the result of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.

          With this being said, there are additional details within Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, stipulating the circumstances in which Crown infringements of Aboriginal title may be justified (“constitutionally recognized aboriginal rights are not absolute and may be infringed by the federal and provincial governments…”). As such, we should consider whether the Canadian government could find justifications for the infringed use of Wet’suwet’en territory In constructing the CGL pipeline. In the document, the two tests of potential justification include: (1) furthering a compelling and substantive legislative objective; and (2) acting as is consistent with “the special fiduciary relationship” between the Crown and Indigenous peoples (e.g., “the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power,” “general economic development,” “protection of the environment,” and the “building of infrastructure and settlement of foreign populations”) (3 SCR 1010, 1997). First then, the CGL project does not stand to contribute towards any immediately notable legislative objective, and so cannot be warranted under the first test of justification. Second, while an argument might be made for the infrastructure, employment, and “economic development” produced within Indigenous communities by the CGL pipeline, the project also contributes towards ecological destruction and population displacement while providing the Indigenous communities with only a fraction of the total economic value estimated of the project (Simmons, 2022)—thus rendering any claims of the pipeline’s contributions towards a productive fiduciary relationship as tenuous and one-sided, and illustrating that the CGL pipeline is proven unjustifiable by both tests. As such, the use of the Wet’suwet’en land by federally— commissioned enterprises would rely upon the full and lawful consent of Aboriginal title holders— in this case, the hereditary chiefs.

            With the Canadian government’s infringement of Wet’suwet’en land rights thus proven unjustified, their use of police action to enforce lawful compliance within Wet’suwet’en communities while refusing to hold themselves accountable to their own legal abidance of Aboriginal title demonstrates a self-contradictory logic, which effectively undermines the legal precedent meant to support Canadian-Indigenous relations in a broader sense. The federal government’s policing, surveilling, and criminalization of the Wet’suwet’en community via RCMP police action throughout the pipeline’s construction, negligent of the community’s title rights, is indicative of whose interests are most readily maintained and whose most undermined within Canadian-Indigenous legal confrontations. In criminalizing land defence and mobilizing police action against Indigenous protestors, and thus in transgressing the principles of Aboriginal title belonging to the Wet’suwet’en as is clarified within Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the federal government implicitly retracts the legitimacy of legal frameworks developed to render Canadian-Indigenous relations sustainable and equitable. As Queen’s University professor Michael Luoma remarks on the federal government’s legal maltreatment of Indigenous communities in “Collective Self-Determination, Territory, and the Wet’suwet’en,” “if we cannot provide a consistent [note—consistent] answer to questions, then from a moral and legal perspective, the future relationships between Canada and many other Indigenous nations are in danger of being carried out in an ad hoc or arbitrary manner” (2022). Indeed, the negligent treatment of the Wet’suwet’en community and their legal history, if persisted upon with distinct nations, could further obfuscate Indigenous relations throughout the country. As such, steps should be taken towards the increased acknowledgement of Indigenous communities and the legal rights they are owed, although doing so may, at times, be of great expense to the Canadian government.

Works Cited

Amnesty International (2023, January 6). Canada: Indigenous land defenders criminalized, surveilled and harassed as pipeline construction continues on Wet’suwet’en territory. Amnesty International. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://amnesty.ca/news/joint-press-release/canada-indigenous-land-defenders-criminalized/.

Baker, Rafferty (2022, February 26). A who’s who of the Wet’suwet’en pipeline conflict. CBC. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/wetsuweten-whos-who-guide-1.5471898.

Coastal GasLink (2023, January 12). Coastal GasLink working with Indigenous communities and regulators to cross waterways safely. Coastal GasLink. Retrieved January 20, 2023 from https://www.coastalgaslink.com/whats-new/news-stories/2023/2023-01-12-coastal-gaslink-working-with-Indigenous-communities-and-regulators-to-cross-waterways-safely/.

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 SCR 1010 (1997). https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1569/index.do

Hernandez, Jon (2020, February 13). ‘We still have title’: How a landmark B.C. court case set the stage for Wet’suwet’en protests. CBC. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/delgamuukw-court-ruling-significance-1.5461763.

Luoma, Michael (2022, February 23). “Collective Self-Determination, Territory and the Wet’suwet’en: What Justifies the Political Authority of Historic Indigenous Governments over Land and People” in Canadian Journal of Political Science, 55(1), 19-39. Retrieved January 20, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423921000913.

Simmons, Matt (2022, November 24). Is B.C.’s $6 billion commitment to Coastal GasLink and LNG Canada still economically viable?. The Narwhal. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://thenarwhal.ca/bc-lng-canada-cgl-economics/.

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Democracy Notwithstanding: Canada’s History of the Notwithstanding Clause and its Role in Human Rights

Posted on January 31, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Emma Celeste Thornley

Free Justice Statue photo and picture
Courtesy of William Cho via Pixabay

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enshrines a number of individual rights considered to be essential to the preservation of human rights. Among these are freedom of religion, expression, and association; the right to life, liberty and security of the person; and freedom from unreasonable search, seizure and arbitrary detention. It is a common assumption that these rights and freedoms are absolutely inalienable and immutable. That assumption is wrong.

The notwithstanding clause, otherwise known as Section 33, was introduced to the Canadian Charter by Pierre Trudeau’s office; it was a concession to satisfy concerns that the Charter of Rights, as Trudeau’s office had initially drafted it, was “too powerful” (Zimonjic, 2022). The language of Section 33 holds that parliament, or the legislature of any given province, could temporarily disregard a provision of the Charter outlined in sections 2, or 7-15 (Government of Canada, 2022). There are, of course, limitations; any declaration made via the notwithstanding clause shall cease to be of effect five years after its implementation, though it can be renewed at the end of that 5-year term. At the time of the Charter’s drafting, Section 33 was intended as an escape-hatch (Zimonjic, 2022), evocative of the American “state’s-rights” model. The general understanding was that the notwithstanding clause ought to be a last resort, utilized only in the most unusual of circumstances. By its definition, the notwithstanding clause had the power to disrupt the execution of a number of fundamental Charter principles.

While this power may seem overwhelming on its face, the ability to disregard or supersede an established Charter right is not an unprecedented one. There is a process, called the Oakes Test, by which laws that limit a Charter right can be evaluated as justifiable or an overreach of power. It is a litigious procedure, arising from the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in R v Oakes.

This 1986 case saw the accused, Oakes, charged with possession for the purposes of trafficking after police caught Oakes with hashish oil and cash on his person. Oakes held that the drugs were his own and that he had no intent of selling them; yet, at the time, Section 8 of the Narcotics Control Act, under which he had been charged, held that anyone found with illegal drugs on them was presumed guilty of trafficking. This established a “reverse onus” in Oakes’ criminal trial. Rather than the burden being upon the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Oakes had to prove his innocence (Centre for Constitutional Studies, 2019). Oakes and his lawyers challenged the constitutionality of this onus, claiming it violated his Section 11(d) Charter Right to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court agreed this right had been violated. The ultimate question, however, was whether the violation of this right was justifiable under Section 1 of the Charter: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”

The SCC ultimately ruled that to determine if a law’s imposition on an established Charter right was justifiable, the imposition had to pass a series of tests: first, that the law under review has a goal which is both “pressing and substantial”. Second, that the law limits the right in question only in such a way as is rationally connected to the law’s purpose. Third, the law must minimally impair the right. Fourth, the imposition upon the right is proportional to the effect of the law (Centre for Constitutional Studies, 2019). The Oakes Test is consequentially an effective, consistent measure by which to test whether a law has justifiably infringed upon a Charter right.

The notwithstanding clause’s metric of measurement is nowhere near as comprehensive nor consistent. It is typically invoked when there is a controversial court ruling (McKenzie-Sutter, 2022) and it can, in theory, provide a sanctified avenue by which provincial governments can override federal authority should a federal government overstep their jurisdictional reach (Callaghan, 2021). Supporters of the notwithstanding clause have opined that “It’s entirely possible that a judicial body will make a judgment on rights that many find abhorrent. Under a system where they wield ultimate authority over the matter, there is little recourse to challenge that judgment. The recent decision by the United States Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade is a stark example of this reality” (Callaghan 2021). While the notwithstanding clause is undoubtably conceptually admirable, its application has been controversial and, at times, in contradiction of Canadian citizens’ rights. Section 33 has been invoked some 26 times since its implementation. The majority of those invocations were tabled by Quebec. Most make it past initial invocation and into enactment. Some instances of particularly controversial uses of the notwithstanding clause in recent memory are Alberta’s 2000 case, Quebec’s 2019 case, and Ontario’s 2018, 2021 and 2022 cases.

In the first instance, Alberta invoked the notwithstanding clause in response to the federal government’s passing of Bill C-23 (CBC, 2012). Bill C-23 guaranteed same-sex couples the same benefits as heterosexual couples after a year of cohabitation. Alberta responded by passing Bill 202, which threatened to invoke the notwithstanding clause should Canada ever redefine marriage to anything other than a man and woman (CBC, 2012). The misuse of the notwithstanding clause is self-evident; the Supreme Court of Canada agreed, declaring Bill 202 and its threatened use of the notwithstanding clause ultra vires, or beyond legal authority, as of 2004 (S.C.R. 698, 2004).

In 2019, Quebec introduced the controversial Act Respecting the Laicity of the State, otherwise known as Bill 21. You may recall the furor that arose in the media after Quebec declared their intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause to support this act, which prohibited civil service employees and public teachers from wearing religious symbols, like kippahs, crosses and hijabs while working (Souissi, 2021). Quebec was successful in implementing the notwithstanding clause. Given the notwithstanding clause’s mandatory five year renewal, it may be overturned in the future; it will, regardlessly, impact the religious liberties of Quebec citizens in the meanwhile.

Ontario’s history with the notwithstanding clause is recent, and resultantly unique. In the province’s history, the notwithstanding clause has been utilized three times. First, in 2018, when the Ontario provincial government utilized Section 33 to reduce the number of wards in Toronto from 47 to 25. This reduction occurred alongside a municipal election, raising concerns that the Ford administration was severely infringing upon the democratic rights of voters (Ahmed, 2022). The second invocation occurred in 2021, when the Ford administration passed the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act. In sum, the act prohibited third-party election advertising and advocacy during the election period, such as labour unions. The legislation was found to override the Charter, and was consequently struck down by Ontario Courts (Kelly, 2022). In response, Ford’s administration overrode the Court using the notwithstanding clause. More recently, Ford’s administration tabled the Keeping Students in Class Act, which utilized the notwithstanding clause to mandate striking teachers back to work. It was lambasted as an “unprecedented attack on workers’ rights” (Koskie Minsky LLP, 2022), and consequently revoked and deemed “never in force” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2022).

In sum, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not the inflexible pillar it is sometimes perceived to be. In some instances, its “bending” is to the benefit of the citizenry. Section 33 could permit provincial governments to reject federal overreach, an insulation against oversteps by any prime minister’s administration. Yet like so many things, the notwithstanding clause can be invoked in ways that hinder, rather than uphold, basic rights. The “legalese” used to describe related governmental acts and resultant action can alienate most of us from the realities of what is being passed as law. That alienation may prevent us from realizing how, and when, Charter Rights and Freedoms are eroded without reasonable cause.

There is no question that we are privileged to live in a country like Canada. It is imperfect, and has a longstanding history of colonial violence, but it also has an established constitutional rights framework by which to challenge our own persisting human rights issues. Other nation-states do not necessarily have the same constitutional protections. Given our comparative privilege, it can be easy to forget that human rights are hard-won and, in some instances, easily lost. It is our civic duty to vigilantly monitor the ways in which our rights and freedoms as Canadians are in flux, to prevent government overreach at all levels. If the history of the notwithstanding clause can offer us any insights, it is that human rights are a constant practice, and not a milestone of democracy. We must constantly be mindful of how our rights adjust and flux, decade to decade, administration to administration.


Work Cited

Ahmed, H. (2022, August 8) Toronto v Ontario: Municipal Elections, Freedom of Expression, and Provincial Authority. Centre for Constitutional Studies. https://www.constitutionalstudies.ca/2022/08/toronto-v-ontario-municipal-elections-freedom-of-expression-and-provincialauthority/


Callaghan, G. (2022, July 6) In defence of the notwithstanding clause: Why Canada should hold onto it. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/in-defence-of-the-notwithstandingclause-why-canada-should-hold-onto-it-186375

CBC (2012, January 12) TIMELINE: Same-sex rights in Canada. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/timeline-same-sex-rights-in-canada-1.1147516

Kelly, Y. (2022, March 21) Ontario’s Bill 307 does more to restrict democracy than protect it. York Region News. https://www.yorkregion.com/opinion-story/10591141-ontario-s-bill-307-does-more-to-restrict-democracy-than-protect-it/


Koskie Minksky LLP (2022) The Keeping Students in Class Act. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e7137110-7583-4533-9f18-468074bd55c1

Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2022) Bill 35, Keeping Students in Class Repeal Act, 2022. https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/bills/parliament-43/session-1/bill-35

McKenzie-Sutter, H. (2022, Oct 31) What is the notwithstanding clause? An explainer on the rarely used provision. CTV News. https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/what-is-the-notwithstandingclause-an-explainer-on-the-rarely-used-provision-1.613270

Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79. https://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2196/index.do

Souissi, T. (2021, December 17) Bill 21 (An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State) The
Canadian Encyclopedia. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/bill-21

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Youth Identity and Hong Kong’s New National Security Education

Posted on January 26, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Shivahn Garvie

National security education was incorporated into the Hong Kong school curriculum in the 2021-22 academic year as a consequence of growing localist sentiment and anti-Beijing creed. Last year, the Hong Kong Education Bureau substituted “liberal studies” in secondary schools for a new subject called “citizenship and social development,” and this year authorities have announced that the “current life and society” subject will also be replaced within the next two years.

“Liberal studies” was offered as an optional course in Hong Kong secondary schools alongside “life and society” as of 2012. “Life and society” covered the socioeconomic development of Hong Kong and China and their distinct political systems, but saw minimal uptakes. Pending the expiration of Hong Kong’s autonomy from China approaching in 2047, many fear that the education reforms only mark the beginning of cultural and institutional change in the city. Pro-Beijing politicians accused the more popular elective, “liberal studies”, of radicalizing youth and inciting the 2019 anti-government protests. As a consequence, the Hong Kong Education Bureau replaced “liberal studies” with “citizenship and social development,” centered on lawfulness, patriotism and promoting students’ understanding of China’s national security to foster a national identity.

The core values of “life and society” included social justice and freedom, but the words, “democracy”, “integrity” and “social justice” are notably absent from the curriculum of its replacement subject, “citizenship, economics and society”. Unlike the old subject that aimed to induce political participation, the new subject has dropped content regarding government decision-making procedures, including an admonishment to communicate with the Legislative Council. Instead, “citizenship, economics and society” is oriented towards enriching students’ understanding of Beijing’s jurisdiction through outlining the primary offences under the national security law and the Hong Kong Basic Law. The Education Bureau announced that they would provide teaching materials for the new subject at the beginning of this academic year, and textbooks for 2024. The textbooks will be reviewed by a committee whose members remain undisclosed, ostensibly to protect them from external pressure and prejudice. However, many question the legitimacy of the committee and these textbooks given that the new “citizenship and social development” textbooks from earlier this year erroneously claimed that Hong Kong was never a British colony, but merely an occupied territory.

In addition to academic content reforms, Hong Kong schools are facing pressure to increase teaching time apportioned to patriotic content. The Education Bureau has asked Hong Kong schools to allocate a quarter of teaching time during primary school education to activities and discussions concerning Chinese culture and the constitution. This overhaul of Hong Kong’s primary school education is driven by a new curriculum guide that emphasizes the cultivation of a sense of belonging and identity through national security education to become responsible citizens. This is a stark contrast to the learning goals under the old guide, which stressed the importance of discriminating between right and wrong and tolerance towards diverse values.

Owing to these changes, the Education Bureau conducted an inspection of 169 out of 1,160 schools in Hong Kong in the 2021-22 academic year and deduced that efforts to incorporate national security education into the curriculum was “unsatisfactory”. This inspection was brought on by the revision of the teachers’ code of conduct which details that they must advance national education and divulge illegal activities or “morally deviant information” to authorities. The previous administration promised to revamp the code after lawmakers accused teachers of instigating students’ participation in the 2019 protests.

As the expiration of Hong Kong’s autonomy from China approaches in the year 2047, many fear that these education reforms only mark the beginning of cultural and institutional change in the city. However, the reluctant uptake of nationalist initiatives promises the retention of Hong Kong culture and values for the time being.

Works Cited

Kang-Chung, Ng. “Patriotism, national security education should make up a quarter of primary schools’ teaching time, Hong Kong Education Bureau says”, South China Morning Post, 8 September 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/3191871/hong-kong-education-bureau-suggests-primary-schools-spend?module=hard_link&pgtype=article.

Yiu, William. “What you need to know about Hong Kong’s new school subject focused on national security, sense of belonging”, South China Morning Post, 16 October 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/3196123/what-you-need-know-about-hong-kongs-new-school-subject.

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What Does a World Cup Cost?

Posted on January 24, 2023 | Leave a comment

By Saba Brittain

Undoubtedly the most viewed, and high on the list of the world’s most unifying sporting events, the FIFA World Cup captures the attention of billions around the globe, and last year 32 nations participated, competing for the cup in Qatar. The announcement of Qatar as host of the 2022 World Cup put the country in the international spotlight, drawing criticisms against FIFA and the Qatari government concerning the unjust treatment of migrant workers, who were indispensable to carrying out the numerous construction projects.

Qatar, a country of a smaller size than the state of Connecticut, won the bid to host the 2022 World Cup in December of 2010. The scale of the event required Qatar to launch major construction projects⁠— including new roads, stadiums, hotels, and transportation⁠— in preparation for welcoming 1.5 million football fans. While the exact amount spent by the Qatari government on infrastructure since 2010 remains unclear, the estimates range from 200-300 billion dollars. (Foxman, Nair, 2022).

Let’s consider the fact that Qatar depends on a 2 million strong migrant workforce, which makes up 90% of the country’s overall workforce, and a significant portion of the country’s overall population (Dart, 2022). At the source of the systemic abuse against the millions of migrant workers in Qatar is the kafala (or sponsorship) system, an exploitative labour law system used mostly in the region of the Arab Gulf. The kafala system subjects the migrant worker to the strict control of their employer, who commands the workers’ entry or exit of the country, their ability to change jobs, the renewal of work permits, and their legal status in the country (Dumoulin, 2021). This system facilitates the exploitation of migrant workers and violation of migrant worker rights. Being subject to the will and interest of their employers, migrant workers can be trapped in working conditions that are extremely abusive without any opportunity to leave or oppose. 

While Qatar has implemented some labour law reforms⁠— notably, allowing migrant workers to change jobs without the approval of a former employer and slightly wage increases⁠— these reforms have not been sufficient to abolish the kafala system in Qatar as a whole. Indeed, migrant workers in Qatar have no protection against labour exploitation and are still closely tied to their employer, relying on them for their legal status and permission of entry/exit of the country (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The kafala system is one of many other abuses against migrant workers in Qatar: there have been numerous reports of mysterious injuries, migrant worker deaths due to “natural causes”⁠— a seemingly interchangeable term to describe extreme heat exhaustion⁠— and unpaid wages. 

Despite these reports, FIFA’s silence towards the migrant worker abuse in Qatar has been deafening. They hold responsibility in their decision of granting the right of hosting the World Cup to Qatar without imposing any conditions protecting the human rights of migrant workers employed to build their stadiums. (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

FIFA was aware of the infrastructure deficit in Qatar with regards to accommodating a World Cup and chose to benefit from the exploitation of migrant workers instead of change it. 

Works Cited

Dumoulin, Caroline. “The Kafala System: Incremental Reform Is Not Enough to Stop Abuse against Migrant Domestic Workers.” International Law and Policy Brief, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/nov/27/qatar-deaths-how-many-migrant-workers-died-world-cup-number-toll

Lewis, Aimee, et al. “’Our Dreams Never Came True.’ These Men Helped Build Qatar’s World Cup, Now They Are Struggling to Survive.” CNN, Cable News Network, 21 Nov. 2022, www.cnn.com/2022/11/17/football/qatar-2022-world-cup-migrant-workers-human-rights-spt-intl/index.html.

“Q&A: Migrant Worker Abuses in Qatar and FIFA World Cup 2022.” Human Rights Watch, 18 Nov. 2022, www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/18/qa-migrant-worker-abuses-qatar-and-fifa-world-cup-2022#Q11.

“Qatar: End All Migrant Worker Exit Visas.” Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/06/qatar-end-all-migrant-worker-exit-visas.

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