Refoulement: Europe Funds Migrant Capture and Detention in Libya

Posted on March 7, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Jenna Barhoush

The supposed synonymity of the word migration with mobility could not be more incorrectly reflected in the realities of 21st century migration. Instead, with migration come threats of humiliating immobility. People escape their unsafe conditions of oppression, war, and poverty and undergo a treacherous path with the hopes of reaching Europe’s promises of safety, opportunity, and equality. Yet, while European countries provide such promises for their citizens, their securities are not extended to migrants and asylum seekers from outside the continent. Instead, the European Union is involved in the process of refoulement – the return of migrants to unsafe places – by funding migration detention centres and surveillance in Libya, and by convicting volunteer refugee rescuers for crimes of human trafficking.

The refugee ‘problem’ develops from situations of nation-wide violence or oppression that make a country uninhabitable for most people. This has been the case in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Eritrea in the past two decades, as the countries’ growing insecurities and oppression contributed to a large exodus of refugees. One Syrian claimed that leaving the house to go to school in the morning was preceded with a daily farewell to family members as survival until the end of the day was not guaranteed (Mardini, 2020). While the rate of lives lost accelerate, those who survive the daily onslaught of war are faced with unending insecurities and oppressive conditions. Basic necessities become scarce and incomes nonexistent for many as facilities are destroyed, and production and import halted (McCarthy, 2022). Seeking refuge in other countries thus becomes the only escape for many. Jordan became a popular asylum for many refugees due to its close proximity to the war-stricken countries and its open borders. Yet the country’s own deteriorating economic conditions meant that minimal securities were all it had to offer to the refugees (Francis, 2015). Its structural stresses and overpopulation of refugees led Jordan to increase regularization which in turn led potential migrants to seek other countries for refuge.

Thus, in 2015, refugees from Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iraq headed towards Europe. Europe’s migration policy was based on the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Refugees, and it stipulated a distributed responsibility for the protection of refugees upon entry to European territory (European Commission). This meant that once an individual seeking asylum enters European land or water, their human rights should be met and protection secured.

However, following the 2015 refugee influx, also known as the Europe Migrant Crisis, the policy proved to be more strenuous than not. Countries that had recently opened their doors to refugees, such as Italy in its 2014 search-and-rescue program Operation Mare Nostrum, took a different turn following the migrant crisis (Urbina, 2021). Poland and Hungary completely shut off their doors to migrants, and shoreline countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece, and Malta began turning away migrant boats. Yet as public protest became global with the uncovering of the conditions refugees underwent on their way to Europe, governments could not be as blatant with their policies. Rather than contributing to direct refoulement, Europe began seeking ways to prevent migrants from even getting near to its shores. Two strategies were pursued: funding the capture of migrants in international waters, and ending the process of rescuing migrants from sea.

The former strategy was assisted by the European Union Trust Fund of Africa. Under the guise of addressing the root causes of political instability and displacement in Africa, the Trust Fund allocated 6 billion dollars to migration control (European Commission). Libya alone received half a billion dollars to capture illegal migrants heading to European shores. The year also highlighted the works of Frontex, the EU’s border agency responsible for coastal surveillance. Frontex was provided with resources that included surveillance drones to track migrant boats in both domestic and international waters in the Mediterranean (Urbina, 2021). Upon discovering migrant boats and dinghies, surveillance footage would be sent to Italy which would then signal Libyan coast guards to intercept the migrants. According to an Amnesty International report, around 15,000 people were intercepted at sea and taken to Libya in the first few months of 2021 (2021). European money taints the entire procedure starting with its funding of Frontex’s surveillance, to the training of the Libyan Coast Guard in migrant capture, and ending with the vehicles used to transport migrants from the seas to detention camps in Libya. In addition, a 2008 Treaty of Friendship between Libya and Italy formalized their cooperation in the containment and capture of migrants (Amnesty International, 2021). Italy would return those crossing central Mediterranean, and Libya would punish and detain them.

Upon capture, migrants are taken to detention camps in Ghout al-Shaal where gross human rights violations are carried out. People lie in overcrowded warehouses with poor ventilation and no sanitation (Urbina, 2021). Reports indicate the constant threat of individuals being singled out for physical torture and/or sexual assault (Amnesty International, 2021). Migrants are punished for assumed treachery and espionage, and their lack of cooperation with their oppressors leads to their assault. In the rare scenario where rebellions are successful, the authorities have been reported to conduct raids in shelters used by escaped migrants. HRW reports that on October 1, 5,152 people were arrested, 1 man killed and 15 injured (Roth, 2021). Reporters who attempt to contact prisoners are themselves detained and sometimes tortured under convictions of espionage.

Libyan law also allows for the indefinite detainment of unauthorized foreigners and their use for unpaid labor (Amnesty International, 2021). The migrants are stripped of their human rights as they enter an unending cycle of dehumanizing torture and enslavement with little to no hope for escape. Disappeared individuals are forced to work in factories or in the military indefinitely. Enforced disappearances allow for human rights violations to be conducted in detention centres with no accountability as individuals are erased, detention centres hidden, and violators protected from identification.

The second strategy of indirect refoulement adopted by Europe is the prevention of rescue operations in European waters. When migrants do escape Libyan Coast Guard and manage to enter European waters, calls for help are unheard. Migrants attempting to signal the coast guard are either ignored or are told to turn back. EU states withdrew naval assets from the central Mediterranean to avoid any chance encounters with migrant boats (Urbina, 2021). In the rare scenario where such an encounter does occur, migrants report to being passed by.

Non-state search-and-rescue operations and organizations have been continuously targeted by European states and reduced to powerless existence as they lose their abilities to actually help boats in distress. In 2018, volunteers working on the shores of Greece to provide blankets and water bottles to oncoming migrants were detained and persecuted under the false convictions of human trafficking and espionage (Cossé and Esveld, 2023). Sarah Mardini, a former Syrian refugee of whom the new Netflix movie Swimmers is partly based on, was held and detained in a Greek prison for over 100 days and is currently awaiting trial. Mardini, alongside fellow volunteer Sean Binder, face a sentence of up to 25 years for volunteering in the aid of migrants. In a Ted Talk interview with Odedre Mardini recounted the mental abuse and trauma she encountered in prison (2020). The conviction of volunteers and search-and-rescue organizations prevents any potential for migrant rescue whether that be in the sea or on the shores of Greece. It insinuates in potential volunteers and donors the fear of similar prosecution. Migrants have also become more vulnerable to the heinous consequences of refoulement as there is no longer anyone that can protect them.

The resentment of migrants is becoming more vocalized in Europe with growing accusations of migrants stealing jobs, threatening the safety of individuals, and tainting the European national and ethnic identities. It is thus necessary to point out here that Europe’s current prosperous conditions are tied to the juxtaposed insecurities in the war stricken countries. Firstly, the legacies of European colonialism that have created a perpetual cycle of detriment and exploitation in the global South have funded the parallel wealth and ‘development’ of Europe itself (Tusalem, 2016). Secondly, as indicated by the Treaty of Friendship and the African Fund, current European ties to the global South support oppression. After contributing to the dangerous conditions forcing people to migrate, the least European countries can now do is to protect refugees.

Accordingly, Europe should take responsibility for refoulement and provide compensation for its colonial legacies. This requires the deterring of ties with Libya and creating a more robust system of accountability and transparency for search-and-rescue operations. Only then will migration return to its synonymous equivalent of mobility and movement and be rid of its inappropriate association with life-threatening immobility.

Write for Rights – Sarah Mardini and Sean Binder: https://takeaction.amnesty.ca/page/50419/action/1?locale=en-US

Works Cited

Amnesty International. (2021). Libya: Horrific violations in detention highlight Europe’s shameful role in forced returns. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/ 2021/07/libya-horrific-violations-in-detention-highlight-europes-shameful-role-in-forced-returns/

Cossé, E., Esveld, B.V. (2023). Sea Rescuers Still Waiting for Justice in Greece. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/16/sea-rescuers-still-waiting-justice-greece

European Commission. Common European Asylum System. Migration and Home Affairs. European Commission. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/ common-european-asylum-system_en

Francis, A. (2015). Jordan’s Refugee Crisis. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/21/jordan-s-refugee-crisis-pub-61338

Mardini, S. Interviewed by Odedre, K. (2020). How I was arrested for handing out blankets to refugees | Sarah Mardini. TEDxLondonWomen.

McCarthy, J. (2022). How War Fuels Poverty. Global Citizen.

Roth, K. (2021). Libya. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/ libya#13d8c3

Spindler, W. (2015). 2015: The year of Europe’s refugee crisis. The UN Refugee Agency. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html

Tusalem, R. F. (2016). The Colonial Foundations of State Fragility and Failure. Polity, 48(4), 445–495. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26358277

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). https://www.unhcr.org/ 4ca34be29.pdf

Urbina, I. (2021). The Secretive Prisons That Keep Migrants Out of Europe. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/12/06/the-secretive-libyan-prisons-that-keep-migrantsout-of-europe 

The former strategy was assisted by the European Union Trust Fund of Africa. Under the
guise of addressing the root causes of political instability and displacement in Africa, the Trust
Fund allocated 6 billion dollars to migration control (European Commission). Libya alone
received half a billion dollars to capture illegal migrants heading to European shores. The year
also highlighted the works of Frontex, the EU’s border agency responsible for coastal
surveillance. Frontex was provided with resources that included surveillance drones to track
migrant boats in both domestic and international waters in the Mediterranean (Urbina, 2021).
Upon discovering migrant boats and dinghies, surveillance footage would be sent to Italy which
would then signal Libyan coast guards to intercept the migrants. According to an Amnesty
International report, around 15,000 people were intercepted at sea and taken to Libya in the first
few months of 2021 (2021). European money taints the entire procedure starting with its funding
of Frontex’s surveillance, to the training of the Libyan Coast Guard in migrant capture, and
ending with the vehicles used to transport migrants from the seas to detention camps in Libya. In
addition, a 2008 Treaty of Friendship between Libya and Italy formalized their cooperation in the
containment and capture of migrants (Amnesty International, 2021). Italy would return those
crossing central Mediterranean, and Libya would punish and detain them.
Upon capture, migrants are taken to detention camps in Ghout al-Shaal where gross
human rights violations are carried out. People lie in overcrowded warehouses with poor
ventilation and no sanitation (Urbina, 2021). Reports indicate the constant threat of individuals
being singled out for physical torture and/or sexual assault (Amnesty International, 2021).
Migrants are punished for assumed treachery and espionage, and their lack of cooperation with
their oppressors leads to their assault. In the rare scenario where rebellions are successful, the
authorities have been reported to conduct raids in shelters used by escaped migrants. HRW
reports that on October 1, 5,152 people were arrested, 1 man killed and 15 injured (Roth, 2021).
Reporters who attempt to contact prisoners are themselves detained and sometimes tortured
under convictions of espionage.
Libyan law also allows for the indefinite detainment of unauthorized foreigners and their
use for unpaid labor (Amnesty International, 2021). The migrants are stripped of their human
rights as they enter an unending cycle of dehumanizing torture and enslavement with little to no
hope for escape. Disappeared individuals are forced to work in factories or in the military
indefinitely. Enforced disappearances allow for human rights violations to be conducted in
detention centres with no accountability as individuals are erased, detention centres hidden, and
violators protected from identification.
The second strategy of indirect refoulement adopted by Europe is the prevention of
rescue operations in European waters. When migrants do escape Libyan Coast Guard and
manage to enter European waters, calls for help are unheard. Migrants attempting to signal the
coast guard are either ignored or are told to turn back. EU states withdrew naval assets from the
central Mediterranean to avoid any chance encounters with migrant boats (Urbina, 2021). In the
rare scenario where such an encounter does occur, migrants report to being passed by.
Non-state search-and-rescue operations and organizations have been continuously
targeted by European states and reduced to powerless existence as they lose their abilities to
actually help boats in distress. In 2018, volunteers working on the shores of Greece to provide blankets and water bottles to oncoming migrants were detained and persecuted under the false
convictions of human trafficking and espionage (Cossé and Esveld, 2023). Sarah Mardini, a
former Syrian refugee of whom the new Netflix movie Swimmers is partly based on, was held
and detained in a Greek prison for over 100 days and is currently awaiting trial. Mardini,
alongside fellow volunteer Sean Binder, face a sentence of up to 25 years for volunteering in the
aid of migrants. In a Ted Talk interview with Odedre Mardini recounted the mental abuse and
trauma she encountered in prison (2020). The conviction of volunteers and search-and-rescue
organizations prevents any potential for migrant rescue whether that be in the sea or on the
shores of Greece. It insinuates in potential volunteers and donors the fear of similar prosecution.
Migrants have also become more vulnerable to the heinous consequences of refoulement as there
is no longer anyone that can protect them.
The resentment of migrants is becoming more vocalized in Europe with growing
accusations of migrants stealing jobs, threatening the safety of individuals, and tainting the
European national and ethnic identities. It is thus necessary to point out here that Europe’s
current prosperous conditions are tied to the juxtaposed insecurities in the war stricken countries.
Firstly, the legacies of European colonialism that have created a perpetual cycle of detriment and
exploitation in the global South have funded the parallel wealth and ‘development’ of Europe
itself (Tusalem, 2016). Secondly, as indicated by the Treaty of Friendship and the African Fund,
current European ties to the global South support oppression. After contributing to the dangerous
conditions forcing people to migrate, the least European countries can now do is to protect
refugees.
Accordingly, Europe should take responsibility for refoulement and provide
compensation for its colonial legacies. This requires the deterring of ties with Libya and creating
a more robust system of accountability and transparency for search-and-rescue operations. Only
then will migration return to its synonymous equivalent of mobility and movement and be rid of
its inappropriate association with life-threatening immobility.
Write for Rights – Sarah Mardini and Sean Binder:
https://takeaction.amnesty.ca/page/50419/action/1?locale=en-US Works cited:
Amnesty International. (2021). Libya: Horrific violations in detention highlight Europe’s
shameful role in forced returns. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-
release/2021/07/libya-horrific-violations-in-detention-highlight-europes-shameful-role-in-forced-
returns/
Cossé, E., Esveld, B.V. (2023). Sea Rescuers Still Waiting for Justice in Greece. Human Rights
Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/16/sea-rescuers-still-waiting-justice-greece
European Commission. Common European Asylum System. Migration and Home Affairs.
European Commission. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/
common-european-asylum-system_en
Francis, A. (2015). Jordan’s Refugee Crisis. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/21/jordan-s-refugee-crisis-pub-61338
Mardini, S. Interviewed by Odedre, K. (2020). How I was arrested for handing out blankets to
refugees | Sarah Mardini. TEDxLondonWomen.
McCarthy, J. (2022). How War Fuels Poverty. Global Citizen.
Roth, K. (2021). Libya. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-
chapters/libya#13d8c3
Spindler, W. (2015). 2015: The year of Europe’s refugee crisis. The UN Refugee Agency. https://
www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html
Tusalem, R. F. (2016). The Colonial Foundations of State Fragility and Failure. Polity, 48(4),
445–495. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26358277
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). https://www.unhcr.org/
4ca34be29.pdf
Urbina, I. (2021). The Secretive Prisons That Keep Migrants Out of Europe. The New Yorker.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/12/06/the-secretive-libyan-prisons-that-keep-
migrants-out-of-europe

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Crimes of Humanity

Posted on March 2, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Saba Brittain

On the 10th of January of 2023, the trial of 24 individuals involved in volunteering humanitarian assistance to migrants on the shores of Greece began (Kennedy 2023). This trial appears to follow the trend of European authorities targeting humanitarian workers to discourage solidarity with migrants and deter the arrival of refugees to Europe (Kennedy 2023).

The defendants face serious charges for their work at the Emergency Response Centre International (ERCI), a Greek non-profit organisation that provides emergency aid in dangerous environments. Operating on the Greek island of Lesbos, the “crimes” committed at the ERCI include assisting people whose lives are at risk, searching and rescuing migrant boats in distress, assisting migrant boats on the shoreline (Kitsantonis 2023).

The defendants are accused of facilitating illegal migration to Europe, these accusations have drawn widespread criticism among international human rights organizations. Their charges include espionage, forgery, involvement in a criminal organization, people-smuggling, money laundering and other “farcical” accusations according to Amnesty International (Kitsantonis 2023).

The accusations of espionage condemn the defendants’ initiatives of monitoring local radio channels to learn the whereabouts of migrant boats in distress. (Smith, 2023). The money-laundering allegations incriminate fundraising efforts for the ERCI organization (Smith 2023).

“I am not a people smuggler”, says Sarah Mardini during an interview with BBC, a human rights activist accused of criminal activity and people smuggling following her lifesaving work at the Emergency Response Centre International (BBC 2018). She is one of the 24 defendants on trial and is herself a refugee from Syria (BBC 2018).

A European Parliament report has described this trial as the “largest case of criminalization of solidarity in Europe” (Aljazeera 2023). Many other critiques have suggested this trial is indicative of the efforts to discourage the work of migrant rights defenders and organizations, and deter refugees from coming to Europe (Amnesty International 2022). Simply put, the compassion and solidarity driving the action of the volunteers has been weaponized and criminalized (Amnesty International 2022).

In addition to creating a hostile and insecure environment for human rights volunteers showing solidarity to migrants, this trial delays the work of the ERCI organization. A UN human rights expert suggested that a guilty verdict for the defendants could lead to more migrant deaths at sea (OHCHR 2021). Along with this trial in Greece, several other prosecutions have been set in motion across Europe against NGOs and individuals. Considering the thousands of migrant deaths at sea every year, the effects of these sorts of trials must not be overlooked. Many are calling upon Greek prosecutors to drop all charges against the 24 individuals. (Amnesty International 2022).

Works Cited

“Greece: Guilty Verdict for Migrant Rights Defenders Could Mean More Deaths at Sea – UN Expert.” OHCHR, 18 Nov. 2021, www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/01/greece-guilty-verdict-migrant-rights-defenders-could-mean-more-deaths-sea-un.

“Greece: Migrant Rescue Trial to Begin.” Human Rights Watch, 22 Dec. 2022, www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/22/greece-migrant-rescue-trial-begin.

“Solidarity on Trial in Europe.” Amnesty International, 6 May 2022, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/03/free-to-help/.

Al Jazeera. “Drop All Charges against Refugee Aid Workers, UN Tells Greece.” Migration News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 13 Jan. 2023, www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/13/un-asks-greece-drop-charges-in-syrian-migrant-rescuer-trial.

Kennedy, Niamh. “They Saved Refugees Stranded at Sea. Now They’re on Trial.” CNN, Cable News Network, 10 Jan. 2023, www.cnn.com/2023/01/10/europe/migrant-aid-workers-mardini-binder-trial-intl/index.html.

Kitsantonis, Niki. “Greece Opens Espionage Trial of Aid Workers Who Helped Migrants.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 10 Jan. 2023, www.nytimes.com/2023/01/10/world/europe/greece-trial-migrants.html?searchResultPosition=1.

Smith, Helen. “Long-Awaited Trial of 24 Aid Workers Accused of Espionage Starts in Lesbos.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 13 Jan. 2023, www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jan/13/long-awaited-trial-of-24-aid-workers-accused-of-espionage-starts-in-lesbos.

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The Crisis of MAID and the Argument for Social Reform

Posted on February 28, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Shivahn Garvie

In early February, the Canadian government deferred the expansion of medical assistance in dying (MAID) to individuals suffering solely from mental illness by one year (Zimonjic 2023). Justice Minister David Lametti requested a delay for Bill C-39 to further investigate the potential risks of this new legislation (Zimonjic 2023). An interim report released in June 2022 concluded that “more remains to be done to ensure the necessary steps have been taken” before the March 2023 deadline (Zimonjic 2023).

According to the new bill, “mental illness” encompasses psychiatric conditions like depression and personality disorders, and excludes neurodevelopmental or neurocognitive disorders (Zimonjic 2023). Euthanasia was introduced to Canada in 2015 when the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that prohibiting assisted death stripped citizens of dignity and autonomy (Cheng 2022). Assisted suicide was approved in Canada for individuals 18 and older with terminal illness in 2016, and was extended to those with non-threatening severe and chronic physical conditions in 2021 (Honderich 2023). Since 2016, the number of people receiving medical assistance in dying has increased each year, constituting 3.3% of all deaths in Canada in 2021 (Honderich 2023). The planned expansion to those suffering solely from mental illness has raised concerns about the MAID program as a whole.

Recent reports have indicated that vulnerable individuals are requesting and receiving assisted death due to poverty, loneliness, or lack of housing rather than failing health (Honderich 2023). Some argue that this indicates a crisis of Canada’s social safety net. In May 2022, Marie-Claud Landry, chief commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, stated that giving people the option of assisted death because the government is, “failing to fulfill their fundamental human rights is unacceptable.” (Honderich 2023).

Bill C-39 attracted further criticism from three United Nations human rights experts in 2021 who warned that the expanded law will denigrate Canada’s disabled community, sending a message that serious disability is worse than death (Cheng 2022). Critics point to the story of Alan Nichols as evidence that MAID lacks sufficient safeguards. Nichols was a 61-year-old Canadian with a history of depression and concurrent mental health issues who was hospitalized in June 2019 following concerns that he was suicidal (Cheng 2022). The next month, Nichols requested euthanasia through MAID and was killed despite objections from his family and nurse practitioner (Cheng 2022). After his death, it was revealed that Nichols’ MAID application listed hearing loss as the reason for his request to die (Cheng 2022). Nichols’ family brought this case to the police, claiming that he had not been suffering unbearably, but was confused as he had been refusing to take necessary medication and wear a cochlear implant that helped him hear (Cheng 2022).

Most of the controversy surrounding this expansion is centered on assessing the “irremediability” of mental illness (Honderich 2023). Individuals only qualify for MAID in Canada if their

condition is considered incurable (Honderich 2023). However, the Canadian Mental Health Association cautions that it is “not possible” to classify any mental illness as irremediable, and thus disapproves of the upcoming expansion (Honderich 2023).

Despite fears from the public and professionals, Mr. Lametti assures that this legislation is not being taken lightly, claiming, “We are listening to what we are hearing and being responsive” (Honderich 2023). The federal government promises that Bill-C-39 will respect individuals’ autonomy but prioritize their safety (Honderich 2023). While the expansion of MAID may intimidate many Canadians, this delay should bolster their faith in the governments’ commitment and responsiveness to its people’s concerns.

Works Cited

Cheng, Maria. “‘Disturbing’: Experts troubled by Canada’s euthanasia laws.” AP International News, Associated Press, 11 August 2022, https://apnews.com/article/covid-science-heaalth-toronto-7c631558a457188d2bd2b5cfd360a867.

France-Presse, Agence. “Canada seeks to delay euthanasia for mentally ill.” SCMP, South China Morning Post, 3 February 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3208926/canada-seeks-delay-euthanasia-mentally-ill.

Honderich, Holly. “Who can die? Canada wrestles with euthanasia for the mentally ill.” BBC News, British Broadcasting Corporation, 14 January 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-64004329.

Zimonjic, Peter. “Federal government moves to delay MAID for people suffering solely from mental illness.” CBC, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2 February 2023. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/maid-delay-solely-mental-illness-1.6734686.

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Inhibiting or Protecting? – Questioning the Politics of the Notwithstanding Clause

Posted on February 23, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Tia DeRuiter

In November of 2022, as negotiations over wages and contracts stalled with Ontario education workers, Premier Doug Ford elected to invoke Section 33 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). Also known as the notwithstanding clause, this section of the Charter allows for parliamentary powers in Canada to negate other Charter rights when legislating, for a five-year period (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). In addition, once utilized, this clause eliminates the potential for, and dismisses any objections to the legislation brought forth at the judicial level (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). In Ford’s most recent use of Section 33, he sought to prevent the strike of educational workers, after bargaining with the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) failed to reach a mutual agreement (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). By invoking this clause, Ford, in effect, restricted the right of peaceful assembly, as codified in Section 2 of the Charter (Government of Canada, n.d.b).

Originally intended to distribute power equally among the federal and provincial levels, in recent years, the use of the notwithstanding clause has been questioned by human and civil rights organizations in Canada (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). Though this Section is meant to be invoked in challenging times, many provincial assemblies have begun to utilize this clause more frequently, and often not for its intended circumstances (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). As this clause is ultimately a violation of the rights of Canadians, many scholars and activists have called for its abrogation, and identified its overuse by provincial parliaments (Serebrin, 2022; Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022).

In Ontario, this clause has been called on three times by Doug Ford and his government, though was only enacted twice (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). The first of which was in June of 2021, when Ford utilized Section 33 to limit election funding by third party sources, after his original implementation of the legislation was overruled by an Ontarian judge (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). Though it was argued that this restriction of funding sought to eliminate outside influence in the provincial election, some argued it was ultimately a restriction of free speech (The Canadian Press, 2021).

Though Ford’s use of Section 33 is certainly troubling for the rights it restricts, it also is not the most blatant nor severe use of this policy to date. Many other provincial governments have utilized this clause to rescind Charter rights, such as the right to freedom of religion (Government of Canada, n.d.a). In 2019, the Government of Quebec passed the controversial and highly opposed Bill 21, that bans public employees from donning religious symbols while at work (Rukavina, 2022). Including hijabs, turbans, and any other religious wear, this bill, in effect, has targeted many of Quebec’s minority groups, and accordingly, has had horrific consequences (Rukavina, 2022). Not only has this legislation passed under the notwithstanding clause taken a large step backwards in religious and personal autonomy, but has, according to the Association for Canadian Studies, led to steep increases in hate speech and violence against these communities (Rukavina, 2022). Though in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, the Quebec government’s discriminatory and exclusive policy may persist with the protection Section 33 confers. Further, in 2000, the notwithstanding clause was also invoked in Alberta, to make changes to the province’s Marriage Act, and lay out a definition that saw marriage as an act that should only occur between a man and a woman (Mckay-Panos, 2018). Though not renewed after the clause’s five-year period, this too posed severe limitations on Albertan’s rights guaranteed by the Charter at that time (Mckay-Panos, 2018).

Though established with good intentions, the notwithstanding clause appears to have evolved as a weapon wielded by provincial governments to restrict the rights of Canadian citizens. Alongside concerns over the use of Section 33 comes calls to eliminate its existence from the Charter, for the injustices it has both enabled, and has the power to permit. Human and civil rights groups alike have begun these calls, such as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, believing that this policy must be reversed to protect the very rights upon which the clause infringes (Zimonjic & Chevalier, 2022). While the repeal of this clause is highly improbable, it is nevertheless important to direct attention to, and call into question the invocation of a Charter section being used to inhibit rights, as opposed to protecting them. Ultimately, as Wherry elucidates, this clause allows the rights and freedoms of the majority to be dictated and controlled by the majority and those in power, which is contrary to the nature of the human rights Canada claims to defend (2022).

Works Cited

Government of Canada. (n.d.a). Section 2(a) – Freedom of religion. Government of Canada. https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art2a.html

Government of Canada. (n.d.b). Section 2(c) – Freedom of peaceful assembly. Government of Canada. https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art2c.html

Mckay-Panos, L. (2018, November 2). Effects of the notwithstanding clause on human rights. LawNow. https://www.lawnow.org/effects-of-the-notwithstanding-clause-on-human-rights/

Rukavina, S. (2022, August 4). New research shows Bill 21 having ‘devastating’ impact on religious minorities in Quebec. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/bill-21-impact-religious-minorities-survey-1.6541241

Serebrin, J. (2022, May 29). Quebec’s use of notwithstanding clause in language law opens constitutional debate. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-notwithstanding-clause-constitutional-debate-1.6470091

The Canadian Press. (2021, June 14). Ford government pushes through controversial election spending bill with notwithstanding clause. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/notwithstanding-clause-vote-ontario-1.6064952

Wherry, A. (2022, June 1). The case for making the notwithstanding clause politically awkward again. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/charter-rights-notwithstanding-clause-constitution-1.6472317#content

Zimonjic, P., & Chevalier, J. (2022, November 6). The notwithstanding clause – what it is, why it was used and what happens next. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/notwithstanding-clause-explained-ford-1.6641293

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A Glimpse of Russia’s North: Indigenous Resistance and the Rise of the Voice of the Tundra

Posted on February 23, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Pengyu Chen

The Voice of the Tundra (Golos tundry) is an activist community on Russia’s media platform, “V Kontakte,” which represents the voices of Arctic Indigenous peoples in Russia’s Northwest Yamal Peninsula. Organized by and under the leadership of Nenets reindeer breeder Eiko Sérotétto, this local activism emerged in response to the state’s ongoing and intensifying industrialization in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YaNAO). Specifically, Golos tundry is concerned about environmental degradation, loss of land to extractivist industries, impoverishment of traditional Indigenous lifestyle, and state curtailment of Indigenous political organization.


As political scientist Arbakhan K. Magomedov recently noted, as a result of the state’s push for accelerated industrial development in YaNAO, the social tension between the Indigenous peoples of this region, the Nenets tundra aborigines, and the state and businesses have been “pushed to the limit” (Magomedov 220). The Russian government has turned the YaNAO into its “new oil-and-gas province” at the expense of the habitat and Indigenous way of life (Magomedov 216). Relying on Magomedov’s research, this article brings to light some of the material and political challenges the Indigenous peoples of this intensely industrialized region face.


Similar to Indigenous struggles against settler colonial states in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere, Indigenous peoples of the Nenets tundra perceive themselves as struggling against the Kremlin’s extensive encroachment of their land and aggressive deprivation of the Indigenous way of life. This social change and tension were triggered by the state’s industrial development plans as early as 2009. The Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug has been experiencing extraordinary transformative changes in its resource-extraction capacity compared to other regions in the last decade (Magomedov 220). In September 2009, the then-premier of the Russian government, Vladimir Putin, declared during a conference in Salekhard that “The fields discovered on the peninsula can and must become our new oil-and-gas province” (Magomedov 220). Numerous industrial large-scale development projects soon followed. For example, the massive gas project Bovanenkovskoe was launched in 2012, and it was followed in 2013 by the construction of the USD$27 billion “Yamal LNG” (Liquefied Natural Gas) project, which consists of the production, liquefaction, and delivery of gas at the Yuzhno-Tambeiskii field. Additionally, the “Arctic LNG-2” project is set to launch this year. As of 2019, there were about sixty oil-and-gas companies (Magomedov 226).


These industrial development projects of the past decade have altered the natural landscape within Indigenous communities. For example, large areas previously used by Nenets for breeding and grazing reindeer are now occupied by oil-and-gas companies to extract, store, and transport natural resources. At least 6 percent of the land previously used by the locals for grazing is in the grip of the “Yamal LNG” project in Sabett (Magomedov 226-227). Eleven million hectares of land are in the hands of “Gazprom,” the partially state-owned multinational energy corporation (Magomedov 227). Infrastructure of all sorts, from gas pipelines to airfields and highways to settlements, had led to “the further contamination and degeneration of tundra expanses” (Magomedov 227). A significant amount of water surface area has been siphoned for the port of Sabetta, and a large amount of the Gulf of Ob’s aquatic area has been claimed for oil-and-gas industries (Magomedov 277). All of these industrial developments contribute to making the resources and land scarce for Nenets, contributing to the emergence of the Golos tundry.


Moreover, Indigenous peoples’ material well-being is at stake. Because economic actors are unwilling to give up these oil-and-gas industries, which contribute to the region’s economic growth and revenue, it is impossible for oil-and-gas companies to return former Indigenous kin-group land. Nenets, therefore, cannot access their land for breeding and grazing their reindeer. Many Yamal reindeer breeders expressed that they will face a depletion of land for reindeer husbandry, the threatened starvation and malnutrition of reindeer, and, as a result, loss of income (Magomedov 224).


In fact, the acute social tension between the Nenets and oil-and-gas companies is exacerbated by the disruptive intersection between the large-scale industrial complex and the largest reindeer herd in Russia (Magomedov 226). Natural disasters further exacerbate this predicament. For example, in the winter of 2013-14, about 90,000 reindeer perished due to a severe ice storm, and, in the spring of 2018, many more perished from a cold spring and an ice storm in addition to the shortage of grazing lands (Magomedov 232). Neither the state nor industrial enterprises compensate for these losses, although they are responsible for excluding reindeer breeders from using the land. Many reindeer breeders indicated to Magomedov that “an atmosphere of living on the edge, frequent environmental and natural cataclysms, and persistent risks have created an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear for tomorrow” (233-234).


Another pressing concern of the Indigenous peoples is the absence of leadership and formal representation in the system. There is a lack of statistical representation of Indigenous concerns. According to Magomedov, because the social interests of the Indigenous peoples and organizations are inherently contradictory from the alliance between the state and the capital, “the authorities are not going to support such research, as this threatens the reputation and status of the official Indigenous organizations supported by the state” (231).


In his interview with many Nenets, Magomedov notes that the“existing official Indigenous organizations and leaders are not defending the rights and interests of aborigines” (231). Seventy percent of the respondents expressed that they would “count only on themselves, friends, and relatives,” while 17 percent of them responded that they could rely on the help of “organizations and civic movements representing the interests of the region’s Indigenous peoples,” and only 13 percent of the respondents believe they can rely on “local, okrug, and federal organs of power (Magomedov 231).


This reality reflects the severity of the state’s curtailment of Indigenous organizations. While its activity was suspended in late 2012 by the Russian government, the Association of Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East (RAIPON), which represents the interests of about 300,000 Indigenous peoples, was reinstated in March 2013 with government pressures to reorganize its leadership in a new direction (Magomedov 221). The current elected president, Grigorii Ledkov, is a pro-government United Russia member and State Duma deputy (Magomedov 221). According to Magomedov, this change of leadership seemed forced. The loyal president Sergei Khariuchi was removed, and so were two brothers, Rodion and Pavel Suliandziga, who acted as vice presidents. The latter, Pavel Suliandziga, emigrated to the United States in 2017 because he was subjected to state persecution (Magomedov 241).


The Nenets ethnographer and anthropologist Galina Khariuchi remarked on the Kremlin’s encroachment of Indigenous organizations and Indigenous lands: “I compare the current situation with the 1990s. Then we were deciding our fate ourselves. We freely spoke out and argued at congresses. These days everything is written out for us. Now only delegates can be present at congresses of organizations of Indigenous peoples; they don’t allow ordinary people” (Magomedov 222). For Sergei Khariuchi, this change was not only a “new extensive turn towards industrialization of northern territories” but also the reflection that “[Indigenous peoples] are one of the last barriers standing in the way of companies and states in the extraction of these resources” (Magomedov 222).


Worse, according to Magomedov, the state has double-downed on Indigenous activism in the Okrug. In response to increasing Indigenous activism—the politicization of Indigenous and environmental issues—the authorities of the Okrug perceived it as a “subversive activity” and accused the reindeer breeders of “waging an information war” (Magomedov 235). They also declare Golos tundry as “foreign agents” (Magomedov 235). Furthermore, the director of the YaNAO department of internal policy, Sergei Kliment’ev, declared in the regional parliament that “a stress point is being artificially created in the region, to create a new political reality,” indicating that the concerns of Indigenous peoples are falsely exaggerated (Magomedov 235).


Despite the state’s effort to curtail its movement, Golos tundry continues to raise awareness of its predicament on social media platforms (https://vk.com/golos_tundry) in tandem with the region’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). The leader, Eiko Sérotétto, established a political alliance with CPRF to contend with the Kremlin, becoming the authorized representative of Pavel Grudinin (Putin’s political opponent in the 2018 presidential elections) and, in 2018, a candidate for deputy to the regional parliament as a member of the CPRF (Magomedov 237). Sérotétto expressed his motivation for becoming a deputy: “I am troubled by the poverty and lack of protection of the Yamal’s Indigenous population, the reduction in the size of the reindeer herds and fishery resources. I am worried by the issue of preserving the nature of the tundra. This is our home, we must safeguard it for future generations.”


All of the above is but a glimpse of Russia’s North. As Magomedov’s research shows, political contestation and negotiation between the alliance of the state and capital and local Indigenous peoples have been “pushed to the limit.” And here in this article, I invite the reader to take a step back (but not look away) from the well-covered and hotly discussed ongoing Russo-Ukraine war and learn about the less-talked-about state intervention and capital accumulation in Russia’s peninsula.

Work Cited


Magomedov, Arbakhan. “How the Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Arctic Defend Their Interests: The Social, Economic, and Political Foundations of Indigenous Resistance.” Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia, vol. 58, no. 4, 16 Nov. 2019, pp. 215–245., https://doi.org/10.1080/10611959.2020.1811560.

See also:
Kharyuchi, Galina. “Sacred Places in the Nenets Traditional Culture.” Sibirica, vol. 17, no. 3, Dec. 2018, p. 116–137., https://doi.org/10.3167/sib.2018.170310.

Liarskaya, Elena V. “Settlement Nenets on the Yamal Peninsula: Who Are They?” Folklore: Electronic Journal of Folklore, vol. 41, Apr. 2009, pp. 33–46., https://doi.org/10.7592/fejf2009.41.liarskaya.

Magomedov, Arbakhan K. “Oil Derricks or Reindeer? A Clash of Economics and Traditional Lifeway in Russia’s Far North.” Wilson Center, 22 Feb. 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/oil-derricks-or-reindeer-clash-economics-and-traditional-lifeway-russias-far-north.

Mirovalev, Mansur. “In Russia, Indigenous Land Defenders Face Intimidation and Exile.” Indigenous Rights | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 23 Jan. 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/1/23/in-russia-indigenous-land-defenders-face-intimidation-and-exile.

Staalesen, Atle. “In Russian Tundra Tragedy, up to 80,000 Reindeer Might Have Starved to Death.” The Independent Barents Observer, 3 Mar. 2021, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/climate-crisis/2021/03/russian-tundra-tragedy-80000-reindeer-might-have-starved-death.

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Indian Prime Minister Modi Bans BBC Documentary While Allegations of Human Rights Violations Still Mount

Posted on February 16, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Nesane Nakanthiran

On January 17, the BBC aired a documentary detailing the rise of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and it closely connected the political figure to the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in the Western state of Gujarat, which constituted one of the worst outbreaks of religious violence in recent Indian history.  Subsequently, the Indian government imposed an emergency law which banned the documentary and any of its screenings—even in universities. Unsurprisingly, heavy policing and brutal arrests took place across several campuses as students began protesting against the ban.

As leader of the Hindu nationalist, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India’s largest right-wing party, PM Modi has been haunted for decades due to his inaction and complicity throughout the riots, although he still refuses to take proportionate accountability.

In fact, this was not his first time using the emergency law, nor his first time facing allegations of violating human rights. International human rights organizations and advocates have long been calling upon European leaders to address Modi’s “growing abuses and discriminatory policies” (Molander 2022). For example, BJP-led states have seen increasing illegal demolitions of Muslim properties, while Indian authorities have seen a heavy crackdown on students, journalists, civil society, human rights activists, and others who prove either critical towards the state or work to defend human rights amongst vulnerable communities (Molander 2022). Indeed, PM Modi even sanctions the increased use of intrusive technologies, such as Israeli-produced spyware, to curtail human rights and freedom of expression —a decision which proves unsurprising from the BJP leader.

The 2002 anti-Muslim riots took place in response to the burning of a train carrying Hindu pilgrims. Local citizens had blamed the 59 deaths on Gujarat’s Muslims, which led to instances of religious violence claiming over 1,000 lives. At the time, Modi was the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat, and thus, Muslim criticisms against the current Indian PM are substantial. Furthermore, police are accused of standing by while Modi faced such criticisms, perhaps even supporting Hindu extremists throughout the riots. Specifically, the documentary highlights an “unpublished report from the U.K. Foreign Office that claims Modi was ‘directly responsible’ for the ‘climate of impunity’ that enabled the violence” (Syed 2023), despite the leader’s supporters citing a 2013 Supreme Court ruling “insufficient evidence to prosecute.”

PM Modi is not alone in facing immense backlash for his use of censorship. By invoking emergency laws on Twitter and YouTube, Twitter CEO and self-proclaimed saviour of free speech, Elon Musk, has come under criticism for carrying out acts which proved contradictory to his public campaign against censorship throughout his Twitter takeover. To be clear, emergency laws extend government censorship over social media companies, which would explain how Twitter and YouTube had their hands tied. Yet, this does not diminish the Indian government’s violations against democracy, free speech, and human rights—rather, it only further substantiates the dangers of granting unchecked authority over media to a powerful few.

Currently, the emergency law remains enforced across Twitter and YouTube, and Indian police continue to crack down on illegal screenings of the documentary.

Works Cited

Ellis-Petersen, Hannah. 2023. “India invokes emergency laws to ban BBC Modi documentary.” The Guardian, January 23, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/23/india-emergency-laws-to-ban-bbc-narendra-modi-documentary

Hussain, Murtaza and Ryan Grim. 2023. “Elon Musk Caves to Pressure from India to Remove BBC Doc Critical of Modi.” The Intercept, January 24, 2023. https://theintercept.com/2023/01/24/twitter-elon-musk-modi-india-bbc/

Molander, Måns. 2022. “European Leaders Should Raise Human Rights Concerns with Modi.” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/european-leaders-should-raise-human-rights-concerns-modi

Syed, Armani. 2023. “India Banned a BBC Documentary Critical of Modi. Here’s How People Are Watching Anyway.” Time, January 26, 2023. https://time.com/6250480/bbc-modi-documentary-skirting-censors/

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Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy

Posted on February 14, 2023 | Leave a comment

By Laura Moldoveanu

Canada has had a nearly six-year commitment to feminist foreign policy, with the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FAIP) announced on June 9th, 2017 as a means of rendering Canada into a global leader in women’s empowerment. Though it is a somewhat overlooked and forgotten development, the FAIP substantiates the importance of women’s rights in the international system, thus warranting this article’s assessment of the policy’s context, intent, implementation, success, and issues.

In Canadian society, women face unique adversities to equality, including forced marriage, gender-based violence, fewer education opportunities, legal barriers to work, more familial responsibilities than men, and limited control over reproductive health (Global Affairs Canada, 2021). Essential to Canada’s FAIP is the belief that, by promoting gender equality, the nation may effectively decrease poverty rates. In theory, allowing women greater participation in the economy would increase economic growth in the targeted nation(s), thus concerning Canada as such an investment in assistance would enhance national prosperity. The FAIP was announced after a year of consultation with over fifteen thousand people in sixty-five countries, including several women’s rights groups (Lamensch, 2020). Furthermore, the policy referenced a 2015 plan to reduce poverty and build peace, entitled the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

Six key areas of the policy include gender equality, human dignity, inclusive governance, climate action, peace and security, and “growth that works for everyone” (Global Affairs Canada, 2021). Gender equality involves a sexual violence initiative and engages with differing levels of government to deliver programs supporting women’s rights; human dignity pertains to health and education; governance stresses the importance of political participation; climate action covers loss of resources, such as clean drinking water and renewable energy; peace and security involves women in post-conflict nation-building and peace negotiations; lastly, growth engages with economic and ownership rights. Overall, it is clear that the policy covers a huge range of issues. In one sense, this is beneficial because the policy is not limited, however, it also indicates that the policy lacks a cohesive vision.

Implementation involves investment, innovation, and partnerships. Canada vowed to put fifteen percent of its bilateral international development assistance investments towards gender equality. The policy abandons Canada’s previous “countries-of-focus” approach that concentrated assistance on a small list of countries and, instead, involves a broader range of countries, with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Involvement with multilateral groups such as the UN, G7, and G20—as well as the private sector, for financial assistance—is also a key part of the policy. Finally, civil society organizations such as women’s rights groups are expected to receive one hundred and fifty million dollars to develop programs to help promote gender equality (Global Affairs Canada, 2021).

Turning to real-world results, the official policy website boasts a list of success stories under the subheading “our policy in action.” From setting up community centres in Iraq refugee camps to clearing landmines out of Colombia, the policy seems to live up to its many goals in terms of both mission diversity and cross-global span.

With that being said, however, the policy must also be looked at through a more critical lens. There are contradictions and issues associated with Canadian foreign policy, and feminist foreign policy in particular. Scholars and policy analysts argue that the policy does not include definitions of gender or feminism, leaving out marginalized groups such as intersex or transgender persons (Tiessen, 2019), while also lacking inclusion of LGBTQ+ individuals who may face added discrimination beyond gender. Furthermore, the efficacy of the policy is inhibited by other Canadian foreign policy objectives; for example, while the FAIP promotes the empowerment of female peacekeepers, the Canadian government nonetheless continues in concurrently selling weapons to Saudi Arabia (Bouka, 2021). As for more technical problems, the policy has no clear measures of success or ways to monitor long-term impact.

So, is the policy just performative activism? Canada has made it clear that the government views women’s empowerment as an important area to focus on, with a long-term goal of reducing poverty around the world. With that being said, the current impact and efficacy of the FAIP is a mixed bag. In the coming years, perhaps a revaluation will be needed to judge whether the policy is making any substantial long-term impact on gender equality.

Works Cited

Bouka, Yolande, et al. “Is Canada’s Foreign Policy Really Feminist?” Network for Strategic Analysis , Network for Strategic Analysis , 7 Oct. 2021, https://ras-nsa.ca/publication/is-canadas-foreign-policy-really-feminist-analysis-and-recommend ations/.

“Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy.” Global Affairs Canada. Government of Canada, August 24, 2021. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorit ies-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng.

Lamensch, Marie. “Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy.” The Canadian Encyclopedia. Historica Canada, July 31, 2020. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canada-s-feminist-foreign-policy.

Tiessen, Rebecca. “What’s New About Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy.” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Canadian Global Affairs Institute , Dec. 2019, https://www.cgai.ca/whats_new_about_canadas_feminist_international_assistance_policy_the_ problem_and_possibilities_of_more_of_the_same.

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‘Are you sure? I think you might just be overreacting’: The “Nothingness” of Microaggressions and Brandon Taylor’s ‘Real Life’

Posted on February 9, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Jasmin L.K. Smith

Courtesy of Riverhead Books

Brandon Taylor’s Real Life is a beautiful, silent, creeping story of Black sexuality and the hidden anti-Black aggressions of academia. When I finished this novel, I was at Old Mill Station, sitting on the TTC on my way home from class on a chilly September night, not quite a flashbulb memory, but very close given the impact this story had on me. This is a novel that I will always recommend, and, having faced racism in an academic setting on multiple crushing occasions, it is a novel that brought me to tears. Brandon Taylor’s Real Life is a love letter to every Black academic, acknowledging the frustrating microaggressions deeply embedded into academic structures that often go ignored by our peers, but, more importantly, it is also a love letter to himself.

Brandon Taylor’s debut novel is a novel, seemingly, about nothing. When I had first read the climax, I had to go back and read it over again to confirm that it was, in fact, the climax. I easily fell in love with Taylor’s ability to accurately portray such a multi-dimensional situation, a life being lived; the ‘nothingness’ of the novel was not like watching paint dry, or waiting for water to boil, it was like a walk through the woods at night, hoping and praying for nothing to jump out. It was beautiful and tragic and redeeming, and it felt like, for the first time, I had the words and the stories that I had always been in search of.

Real Life begins with Wallace, the only Black student in his PhD program at a university in Alabama, going to the lake to meet his friends. The scene introduces his group of five, all of which are white PhD students that attend the same school. Throughout the novel, Taylor builds characters that anybody could encounter in their academic career, with the honesty of portraying Wallace as someone that often feels like an outsider within the cliquey dynamic of his friends. 

In the laboratory where he spends much of his time, Wallace is subjected to impatience, frustration, and thinly veiled racism from the other scientists around him. Out of the lab’s characters, Brigit is the only redeemable personality, being a loyal and compassionate friend to Wallace. Much of his time in the lab portrayed in the novel is spent attempting to restart research that had been ruined by Dana, a scientist in the lab that seems to hate Wallace for no reason. Of course, the explanation for Dana’s behavior is much less simple, and her constant attempts to alienate and typecast Wallace make it very obvious that her behaviors are microaggressions. To outsiders, or non-Black people that have never had to see a woman’s knuckles turn white around her purse strap the moment you walk into a room, microaggressions often seem absurd, and they are often dismissed as being a figment of Black imaginations. Being Black, particularly in academia where faculty and peers refuse to acknowledge the elephant in the room, it is unimaginably frustrating to experience the same daily patterns of small, racist acts and get told that they are being imagined. Taylor doesn’t beat around the bush with his depiction of microaggressions, he does not shy away from the frequency of them, nor does he create a magical solution to them for the sake of narrative. As is the nature of microaggressions in real life, nobody believes Wallace when he tries to speak up. Rather than someone recognizing Dana’s behavior as stemming from racism, Wallace is blamed for creating a toxic environment in their lab. 

The microaggressions don’t end at Dana, who non-Black readers could dismiss as being raised in a racist environment or simply hateful of Wallace’s success, but it continues into Wallace’s own friend group. At a dinner party with every single one of his friends– save for Brigit– in attendance, Wallace’s thoughts of leaving his program are openly shut down because of what Roman, a friend of a friend, calls his “deficiencies” (Taylor 109). Prior to using this term, Roman describes how, without his doctorate, Wallace would suffer because of “the prospects for . . . black people” (108). He continues to describe Wallace’s thoughts of leaving as selfish and ungrateful, because Wallace apparently owes his department for even being so gracious as to let him in. The entire table is privy to the conversation between the two of them, but no one says a word, nobody makes any attempt to stand up for Wallace, or address the very obvious racism from Roman. During the encounter, “Wallace can only taste ashes in his mouth,” and reading the scene, I felt much the same (109). Despite the feelings of irreverence that I had towards the characters in Taylor’s constructed world at that moment, I had been in situations entirely too similar, and just as off-putting and disharmonious. 

Wallace’s most poignant relationship is the one that he shares with Miller, a friend of his that swears to be straight in spite of his ongoing affair with Wallace. Miller often downplays the situation between him and Wallace, hiding it away from the world. Wallace is made, as he was in his childhood, to feel dirty, to feel like he is the one to be blamed. Despite the constant, underlying pulse of wanting Miller to do and be better, Miller never changes, he is always the wolf of the fable. What’s worse is Wallace’s easy acceptance of the way he is treated by Miller, and even their other friends; he cannot see himself ever being in the right, he is alway on the offering end of an unneeded apology. 

We, as readers, get to earnestly consider the complexities of Wallace’s grief, having been a victim of his father’s cruelty in the past, and presently refusing to acknowledge that he is even experiencing grief for someone that had cared for him so little. Wallace must reconcile with the fact that he may not fit in at his university, but he may not have fit in during his childhood either. So what does that leave him with? What kind of place can he make for himself with what he has left? Though Wallace may seem like a pushover at some points, throughout the story he allows himself to think the thoughts that scare us too much to examine ourselves. He has spent years of his life in a scientific field, and he has gotten as far as being in a doctorate program, but he is now doubting whether it is something he really wants. After losing so many years of his life on his program, even entertaining the thought of leaving is brave, and it’s not something that many people would consider doing themselves. Wallace is not thinking of quitting because of the difficult dynamics of his program, but because maybe he has spent his entire academic career being driven by the opposite; maybe his academic career wasn’t in spite of others, but to prove that he could survive their spite.

Wallace’s story is painfully relatable and uncompromisingly truthful, and much of that is because it is semi-autobiographical to Taylor’s own life. Taylor himself had been born and raised in Alabama, and he dropped out of his own PhD program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to pursue writing (Wheeler). His own university experiences were often filled with microaggressions and dissonance, well reflected in the progression of Wallace’s story in Real Life. Taylor “didn’t write this book for the white gaze,” he wrote it for people like his “queer, black friends” that felt as if modern campus novels didn’t “represent [them] in any sort of substantive way” (Wheeler). Though the novel does create a digestible framework for non-Black people to understand how deeply racism is embedded into academia, the novel’s purpose is not to educate, it is to show Black students, Black lovers of academia, that their experiences are real and their stories are worth being told. As a Black student, it is incredibly difficult to love an institution that will always be systemically against you, but Taylor understands it, and Wallace lives it. 

Wallace’s struggles throughout Real Life do not fall on opposite ends of a spectrum, they don’t go from a bad hair day to saving the world from an apocalypse, no, Wallace’s problems are mundane; from silent, internal mental health issues, to being on the losing end of a difficult situationship. Wallace has problems that you would hear friends talking about over coffee, or see questions on an advice blog about. In an interview with the writers at the Booker Prize Foundation, Brandon claims “close observation” to be “how [he makes sense] of the world” (Booker Prize Foundation). His concentrated, persistent scrutinization of the regular and mundane creates a story that feels so exacting and sharp that, at points, it feels almost monumental in the way that it encapsulates a life lived. I struggle to find words to describe the various complete and incomplete feelings I was left with at the book’s finish because ‘mundane’ reduces it to something unworthy of a read. Real Life is melancholic, celebratory, validating, and unrelenting, but, above all else, it is honest.

Works Cited

Booker Prize Foundation. “Brandon Taylor Q&A.” The Booker Prizes, 2020, https://thebookerprizes.com/brandon-taylor-interview-real-life.

Taylor, Brandon. (2020). Real Life. Riverhead Books.

Wheeler, André. “’I didn’t write this book for the white gaze’: black queer author Brandon Taylor on his debut novel.” The Guardian, 5 March 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2020/mar/05/brandon-taylor-author-real-life-interview.

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Representation matters: a look into representation of the LGBTQ+ community in The Owl House

Posted on February 7, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Anonymous

Courtesy of Disney

We always say that “representation matters”, but what constitutes good representation of minorities in the media?

Disney’s animated show “The Owl House” was released in 2020 and has received much praise for the diversity in its characters. However, it was announced (not long after its release) that the show will not continue past season 3, as the show “did not fit Disney’s brand”; no official statement was ever released regarding how exactly it deviates from the usual Disney series (Anderton, J, 2021). Though it is saddening to see it end so quickly, The Owl House was truly an amazing show.

There are definitely other examples of good representation, and it is far from perfect, but I chose The Owl House as I believe that representation in children’s media is especially important. Many studies have shown that as children learn by observing their surroundings, they are impressionable and very easily influenced by the media that they consume (“Adolescents and the Media: Medical and Psychological Impact,” 1995). Positive representation of different minority groups in children’s media encourages the younger generation to learn more about different communities, subverting existing stereotypes against certain minority groups.

Therefore, to celebrate the release of the first episode of the last season a few months back, let’s take a look into why I personally believe The Owl House to be a great example of what representation in media should look like.

One of my favourite things about the representation in this show is that they are not simply putting in characters as “token minorities”. More often than not, shows nowadays tend to include minorities as side characters to appear “progressive”; some creators expect praise and credits for doing the bare minimum of having characters of diverse backgrounds. Most of the main characters in The Owl House are canonically queer, which is actually much more common in real life compared to having one “gay best friend” in a heterosexual friend group, so common that many queer people have reported that they tend to “flock together” (Jernigan, C., & Mistree, B. F., 2009). As a result, queer people in the show have different personalities, ethnicities, interests, and style, subverting the stereotypes around the community and emphasising intersectionality.

It is also important to bring up the fact that the show educates young children about different sexualities and genders. Lilith Clawthorne is canonically aromantic and asexual, and Raine Whispers is non binary. These are parts of LGBTQ+ community that is often neglected when it comes to representation in media.

In addition, the show does not focus on how the characters face judgements for being queer, unlike most western media nowadays where nine out of ten times gay characters’ character arc revolves around the fact that they are queer. While the show addresses the struggles the main character, Luz, faces for being “different” or “weird”, she was never judged for being bisexual; a scene that I remember distinctly was that the “mean girl” or bully in the show, Boscha, had always mocked Luz for everything that she does, but never the fact that she is dating another girl, Amity, to which her only comment was “they are not that cute.” (Fun fact: Boscha has two moms.) Another scene I found worthy of note was when Amity’s mother, Odalia, said Luz was unfit for her daughter, and that she would find Amity “a new girlfriend”; even though Odalia is an overall insufferable person and had a questionable parenting style, she did not hold judgement for the fact that Amity is a lesbian. In most western media, typically teen dramas, the above examples would have been a perfect moment to introduce homophobia into the show, per usual; however, The Owl House chose not to and created a world of comfort for its audience. While characters still face many problems in their lives (spoiler alert: the world ending, and all that), being queer seems to be the norm, or at least as common as being cisgender and/or heterosexual in this world.

I believe that the kind of representation in The Owl House, where diversity is celebrated, is much more effective (compared to constantly emphasising on the negativity that queer people face) in educating the younger generation and allowing queer youth feel seen. Not only was diversity in sexuality shown in a sense that there are gay characters, but it was also shown within the community, educating its audience about the “Q+”. All in all, The Owl House did a great job in being truly inclusive of different sexualities and genders, and I can not wait to watch season 3 next year.

Works Cited

1. Adolescents and the media: medical and psychological impact. (1995). Choice Reviews Online, 33(02), 33–0735a. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.33-0735a

2. Anderton, J. (2021, October 9). Owl House boss shares real reason why Disney cancelled the show. Digital Spy. Retrieved December 3, 2022, from https://www.digitalspy.com/tv/ustv/a37915254/owl-house-disney-cancellation-reason/

3. Disney Channel’s ‘The Owl House’ Gets Season 2 Order Ahead of Series Premiere (Exclusive). (2019, November 21). Hollywood Reporter. Retrieved December 4, 2022, from https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/tv/tv-news/disney-channels-owl-house-gets-early-season-2-order-1256811/

4. Jernigan, C., & Mistree, B. F. (2009). Gaydar: Facebook friendships expose sexual orientation. First Monday. https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v14i10.2611

5. Terrance, D. (Director). (2020, January 10). The Owl House. Disney.

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The Wet’suwet’en Pipeline & Canadian-Indigenous Legal Conflict

Posted on February 2, 2023 | Leave a comment

by Juliano Gaglione

Courtesy of CBrentPatterson via Twitter

           Three weeks ago, Amnesty International issued a press release regarding LNG Canada’s Coastal GasLink pipeline, criticizing the Canadian government and Coastal GasLink (CGL) for their continued policing and criminalizing of Indigenous “land defenders”, who protect their territory from pipeline development. A call-to-action pressuring the Canadian government and CGL to allow the “Wet’suwet’en people [to] exercise their rights over their traditional territories” (Amnesty International, 2023) was released, the article addresses a conflict prompting questions of whether the Wet’suwet’en community possesses legal rights to unceded land, whether such rights are acknowledged by the Canadian government, and, more importantly, whether such conflict constitutes a threat towards Canadian-Indigenous legal relations. Through investigation, we’ll find that the Wet’suwet’en do, indeed, possess legitimate claim to unceded territories and that the Canadian government’s infringement of Wet’suwet’en title proves unjustified. Furthermore, the Wet’suwet’en pipeline conflict illustrates an existing incompatibility between Indigenous and Canadian sovereignty, resulting from the Canadian government’s unsurprising exploitation of fiduciary privileges to substantiate their own economic priorities.

A brief overview of the conflict and opposing interests at hand

          The Coastal GasLink is a natural gas pipeline being developed in northern British Columbia, which partially traverses territory belonging to the Wet’suwet’en First Nation community. While all five relevant Wet’suwet’en Nation’s band councils have signed benefit agreements with CGL consenting to the use of their land for pipeline development, the nation chiefs, possessing power within a “hereditary clan system,” refuse to offer such consent. An important distinction is to be made here between an “elected band council,” the form of political leadership endowed upon First Nations communities by Canadian settlers via the Indian Act; and a “hereditary clan system,” the traditional form of political leadership within First Nations communities prior to colonial contact. Claiming to have been granted Aboriginal title (unceded land rights) in the 1997 trial, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (Hernandez, 2020), the hereditary chiefs argue that the unconsensual yet unremitting development of the CGL pipeline is an unjustified land rights violation. As such, many Indigenous land defenders throughout the province have been protesting these proposed injustices by undermining the pipeline’s construction, and establishing roadblocks to prevent project development officials from reaching their sites (Baker, 2022). Meanwhile, standing to earn an estimated twenty-three billion CDN over the span of forty years following the pipeline’s construction, the federal government has largely endorsed the CGL pipeline ever since first commissioning the project in 2018 (Simmons, 2022)—this financial interest at least partially explains the government’s policing contributions towards the project, with RCMP officers consistently tasked with enforcing the law over supposedly criminally-behaved Indigenous protesters (Amnesty International, 2023). With that said, the pipeline is currently—as of the CGL’s latest briefing—beyond 80% complete, and will likely see full completion in the near future regardless of opposition efforts (CGL, 2023).

          Upon inspection of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (3 SCR 1010, 1997)—a supreme court case resulting from Delgamuukw’s appeal of a previously failed trial—it’s clear that the hereditary chiefs of the Wet’suwet’en First Nations were granted Aboriginal title over their territory in 1997, resulting mainly from the chief justice’s reconsideration of the Wet’suwet’en oral tradition, “kungax,” as valid historical evidence of pre-colonial territorial occupation. In remarking upon the original trial, Chief Justice Lamer stated that “the trial judge expected too much of the oral history of the appellants,” and that “if oral history cannot conclusively establish pre-sovereignty occupation of land, it may still be relevant to demonstrate that current occupation has its origins prior to sovereignty” (3 SCR 1010, 1997). Indeed, in the following trial, such oral history would be found sufficient in illustrating a pre-sovereign origin of occupation, granting Aboriginal title to the hereditary chiefs who brought the case to the supreme court. As a result, the Wet’suwet’en chiefs, by possessing Aboriginal title, possess land rights since 1997 characterized as (1) inalienable; (2) recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 1763; (3) communally held; (4) limited in use to actions which are “reconcilable with the nature of the claimants’ attachment to those lands” (i.e., forbidding ecologically negligent land use); and (5) protected by section 35 the Constitution Act of 1982 (3 SCR 1010, 1997). Clearly, then, Wet’suwet’en protestors are correct in their assertion that hereditary chiefs are owed unceded land rights as per the result of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.

          With this being said, there are additional details within Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, stipulating the circumstances in which Crown infringements of Aboriginal title may be justified (“constitutionally recognized aboriginal rights are not absolute and may be infringed by the federal and provincial governments…”). As such, we should consider whether the Canadian government could find justifications for the infringed use of Wet’suwet’en territory In constructing the CGL pipeline. In the document, the two tests of potential justification include: (1) furthering a compelling and substantive legislative objective; and (2) acting as is consistent with “the special fiduciary relationship” between the Crown and Indigenous peoples (e.g., “the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power,” “general economic development,” “protection of the environment,” and the “building of infrastructure and settlement of foreign populations”) (3 SCR 1010, 1997). First then, the CGL project does not stand to contribute towards any immediately notable legislative objective, and so cannot be warranted under the first test of justification. Second, while an argument might be made for the infrastructure, employment, and “economic development” produced within Indigenous communities by the CGL pipeline, the project also contributes towards ecological destruction and population displacement while providing the Indigenous communities with only a fraction of the total economic value estimated of the project (Simmons, 2022)—thus rendering any claims of the pipeline’s contributions towards a productive fiduciary relationship as tenuous and one-sided, and illustrating that the CGL pipeline is proven unjustifiable by both tests. As such, the use of the Wet’suwet’en land by federally— commissioned enterprises would rely upon the full and lawful consent of Aboriginal title holders— in this case, the hereditary chiefs.

            With the Canadian government’s infringement of Wet’suwet’en land rights thus proven unjustified, their use of police action to enforce lawful compliance within Wet’suwet’en communities while refusing to hold themselves accountable to their own legal abidance of Aboriginal title demonstrates a self-contradictory logic, which effectively undermines the legal precedent meant to support Canadian-Indigenous relations in a broader sense. The federal government’s policing, surveilling, and criminalization of the Wet’suwet’en community via RCMP police action throughout the pipeline’s construction, negligent of the community’s title rights, is indicative of whose interests are most readily maintained and whose most undermined within Canadian-Indigenous legal confrontations. In criminalizing land defence and mobilizing police action against Indigenous protestors, and thus in transgressing the principles of Aboriginal title belonging to the Wet’suwet’en as is clarified within Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the federal government implicitly retracts the legitimacy of legal frameworks developed to render Canadian-Indigenous relations sustainable and equitable. As Queen’s University professor Michael Luoma remarks on the federal government’s legal maltreatment of Indigenous communities in “Collective Self-Determination, Territory, and the Wet’suwet’en,” “if we cannot provide a consistent [note—consistent] answer to questions, then from a moral and legal perspective, the future relationships between Canada and many other Indigenous nations are in danger of being carried out in an ad hoc or arbitrary manner” (2022). Indeed, the negligent treatment of the Wet’suwet’en community and their legal history, if persisted upon with distinct nations, could further obfuscate Indigenous relations throughout the country. As such, steps should be taken towards the increased acknowledgement of Indigenous communities and the legal rights they are owed, although doing so may, at times, be of great expense to the Canadian government.

Works Cited

Amnesty International (2023, January 6). Canada: Indigenous land defenders criminalized, surveilled and harassed as pipeline construction continues on Wet’suwet’en territory. Amnesty International. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://amnesty.ca/news/joint-press-release/canada-indigenous-land-defenders-criminalized/.

Baker, Rafferty (2022, February 26). A who’s who of the Wet’suwet’en pipeline conflict. CBC. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/wetsuweten-whos-who-guide-1.5471898.

Coastal GasLink (2023, January 12). Coastal GasLink working with Indigenous communities and regulators to cross waterways safely. Coastal GasLink. Retrieved January 20, 2023 from https://www.coastalgaslink.com/whats-new/news-stories/2023/2023-01-12-coastal-gaslink-working-with-Indigenous-communities-and-regulators-to-cross-waterways-safely/.

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 SCR 1010 (1997). https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1569/index.do

Hernandez, Jon (2020, February 13). ‘We still have title’: How a landmark B.C. court case set the stage for Wet’suwet’en protests. CBC. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/delgamuukw-court-ruling-significance-1.5461763.

Luoma, Michael (2022, February 23). “Collective Self-Determination, Territory and the Wet’suwet’en: What Justifies the Political Authority of Historic Indigenous Governments over Land and People” in Canadian Journal of Political Science, 55(1), 19-39. Retrieved January 20, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423921000913.

Simmons, Matt (2022, November 24). Is B.C.’s $6 billion commitment to Coastal GasLink and LNG Canada still economically viable?. The Narwhal. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://thenarwhal.ca/bc-lng-canada-cgl-economics/.

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